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SUMMARY 
BACKGROUND: Economic evaluations are used as a tool for making priorities in the health 
care sector and this tool should in principle, reflect individuals’ preferences. In economic 
theory, utility is seen as a way to describe preferences. The utility of life years gained in 
economic evaluations of health care programmes has commonly been treated as a linear 
function of life years gained even though some empirical evidence suggest a diminishing 
marginal utility for lifetime. A power function with a factor less than 1 in the quality-
adjusted life-years (QALY) model has been suggested to account for risk aversion and 
positive time preferences. 
METHODS: In this study, the utility of gain in lifetime up to 1 year was examined in a 
random sample of 2,400 Norwegians aged 40 to 59 years old. In hypothetical scenarios, 
respondents with untreated remaining lifetime of 1 or 10 years were offered treatment with a 
life gain ranging from 1 week to 1 year. The utility of the treatment was measured as 
willingness-to-pay (WTP) in an individual perspective.  
RESULTS: The acceptance rates for offers of life extension treatments with a fixed price per 
week was increasing with longer life extensions and this indicates an increasing marginal 
utility for lifetime gains up to one year. However, the maximum WTP/week was decreasing 
with longer lifetime gains, which might be attributed to reduced ability to pay for longer 
gains. There was no clear lower threshold value for a gain in life extension to be considered 
worthwhile.  
CONCLUSION: If an increasing marginal utility for lifetime gains up to one year reflects 
the population’s preferences, the standard linear QALY model and the power QALY model 
proposed may yield misleading results for decision-making, and QALY weights obtained 
through TTO may be biased.  
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1. ECONOMIC ANALYSES AND HEALTH CARE 
An economist analyses the word by developing models of social phenomena. A model is a 
simplified representation of reality and the model’s power occurs from the elimination of 
irrelevant detail. This enables the economist to focus on the features of the reality he is 
trying to understand. In the analysis of human behaviour, there is a need for a framework on 
which to base the analysis. A framework built on two principles is used in much of economic 
analyses. The first is the optimisation principle: People try to choose the best patterns of 
consumption they can afford. The second is the equilibrium principle: People adjust until 
the amount people demand of something is equal to the amount that is supplied (Varian 
1990). 
The perfect market model in economic theory is an ideal model in which the marginal social 
value equals the marginal social costs. This implies that the last unit of production/service 
produced has a value for society that equals the production cost of the same unit. In the real 
world no market mirrors this model perfectly. Some markets work better than others and in 
the health care market there are several market failures. Key assumptions behind the perfect 
market model are: full information, impersonal transactions, private goods/services, selfish 
motivation, many buyers and sellers, free entry and homogenous goods/services (Dolan and 
Olsen 2002).  
One of the most essential market failures in health care is information asymmetries. The 
potential consumers of health care do not have full information about when they might fall 
ill or what costs to expect due to illness. The patient often lacks information about the 
quality of health care and about the effect of different health care interventions. In 
comparison to physicians, the consumers generally know significantly less with regard to 
treatment effects and the quality of health care. Because of the uncertainties about if and 
when an individual might fall ill and the possibility of accompanying high costs, individuals 
would have a strong incentive to take out health insurance (Dolan & Olsen 2002). In 
Norway, the main costs are covered by society, which implies that society is responsible for 
the main part of the health insurance. 
Another important failure is the assumption of private goods/services as there are 
externalities in health care. A private good is something that only affects the person 
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consuming it. An example of an externality in health care is vaccination.  Not only the 
person who receives a vaccine for an infectious disease receives a benefit from the 
intervention, many other people who else could have been contaminated by the not-
vaccinated person also benefit from the intervention (Dolan & Olsen 2002).  
In the health care sector, there is no normal competition on price. Demand and supply are 
not in equilibrium as in the market model. Since the market in health care is associated with 
several market failures there are reasons for governmental intervention. The main categories 
of intervention are public provision of health care, commodity taxes and subsidies,  
regulation and transfer programs (Folland and Stano 2004). Instead of the competition on 
price, there is a need for alternatives for making priorities in health care. Economic 
evaluation is a tool that can be utilised in priority setting when markets fail to achieve an 
optimal distribution of resources. Even in an unregulated market, evaluation of utility could 
be an effective means for the actors to set the right price on services. 
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2. UTILITY THEORY 
The theory of how to measure and maximise utility is called utility theory (Baron 2000). The 
concept of utility can be defined slightly different depending on the discipline or the 
perspective of the author. In economic theory, consumer behaviour is formulated in terms of 
consumer preferences under a budget constraint, and utility is seen as a way to describe 
preferences. Earlier, in Victorian days, economists and philosophers thought of utility as a 
numeric measure of a person’s happiness (Varian 1990). 
Another view is that utility, as a concept, can encompass the variety of human goals. In other 
words; what people want to achieve. The amount of money we would be willing to pay to 
achieve an outcome does not necessarily represent the utility of the outcome, as money is not 
a universal means to achieve all that we want. We can for example not pay for a total 
absence of disease. We can pay for an injection in order to avoid a disease but we have to 
endure the pain accompanying it. Neither is utility the same as happiness or satisfaction. We 
can be happy when we are expecting to achieve our goals even if we are not achieving them 
now and we get satisfied when we have achieved our goals. There can be many important 
goals which we do not achieve in our lives (Baron 2000). 
A third way of describing utility is as a summary measure of to what degree outcomes affect 
our ultimate goals or values. According to Broome, utility is not a perfect word since it leads 
us to believe that an outcome only has a value as a means to something else. He means 
“good” is better and defines utility as the amount of good or goodness (Broome 1991).  
As seen above, the concept of utility can have slightly different meanings. In this thesis, the 
concept of utility is seen as a way to describe consumer preferences, as in standard economic 
theory.  
The total utility for society is the unweighted sum of household utilities according to a 
utilitarian or Benthamite social welfare function but this distribution of utility can be a 
source for controversies (Johansson 1991). The distribution of total gains across patients, i.e. 
if many receive a little or if a few receive much, is ignored in standard economic evaluations 
used in health care. The assumption is that the effects of differences in distribution are 
negligible when comparing programs. This means that the utility of a large gain to a few is 
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equal to a small gain to many if the total utility is the same in the two distributions (Olsen 
2000). Societal value as a simple, unweighted sum of health benefit is referred to as the 
assumption of distributive neutrality (Nord 1999). 
The assumption of distributive neutrality has been criticised in recent years. The 
maximisation of health gains may be at the expense of fairness. Some distributions can be 
viewed as more fair than others and society might want to reach a balance between 
maximisation of health gains and treating individuals in a fair way (Nord 1999) (Williams 
1997). 
The concept of utility is used in policy decisions. The public’s preferences for different 
benefits compared to others can be used in many of the economic evaluations to evaluate 
which programme generates most utility. Consumer preferences are important to elicit since 
they constitute the basis in the economic concept of utility. 
Different types of preferences form the basis for valuation of benefits of health care. The 
valuation can be formed from two main perspectives. If an individual is asked to consider 
what he/she prefers for himself/herself, the individual perspective is used. If he is asked to 
consider how he would have chosen to spend an amount of societal resources if he was to 
decide, it is called the societal perspective.  
The underlying preferences in the individual perspective is based on the amount of health 
gained, measured as time and quality. There might be a positive time preference, i.e. a 
discounting of future health gains relative to health gains today. The individual might prefer 
certain gains over risky gains as the majority of people are risk averse regarding gains and 
prefer the expected value of a gamble to the gamble itself (Kahneman and Tversky 1984). 
Life situation variables such as age, fulfilled wishes or missions, level of goal achievement 
and whether one has dependants might also influence the valuation of health benefits. There 
might be a minimum threshold quantity of health gains (both in terms of longevity and 
quality) before a gain is considered worthwhile (Dolan et al. 2005). This can for example 
mean that if a gain in longevity is considered too small to be of any significant value one 
would not appreciate the treatment that gave the effect to the same extent as a treatment that 
gave a longer increase in longevity. 
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The underlying preferences in a societal perspective can also be the amount of health gained, 
positive time preference and risk aversion. The positive time preference implies that 
programmes with shorter duration (less to many) are preferred over programmes with a 
longer duration because the present value of the health experienced over the longer time 
period is diminished with relatively more. A preference for equity, i.e. it is better the more 
divisible health gains are between people, give the same effect. Previous research seem to 
indicate that the marginal social value is decreasing both with increases in quality and length 
of life. Another indication is that people seem to have preferences for distribution of health 
gains to persons who have dependants and to persons who have a bad lifetime health 
prospect (Dolan et al. 2005). People may also have a preference for equity between patients 
with respect to total life outcome. Williams argues that everybody is entitled to a lifetime of 
around 70-75 years and if you don’t achieve this you have in a sense been “cheated” and if 
you get more you have in fact got “borrowed” time. This is called the fair innings argument 
(Williams 1997). The possibility of a threshold effect could apply also in the societal 
perspective if the argument is concerning effectiveness of treatment. In the societal 
perspective, this means that if a health gain is considered too small to be of any value one 
would rather prefer to concentrate the gains to a few until the value of the health gain is 
considered to be of a significant size. 
How can we measure utility or preferences and how can we decide which bundle of 
treatments that is most preferred by health consumers? Economic evaluations are used as a 
tool for making priorities and this tool should in principle, reflect individuals’ preferences. 
In this thesis, I focus on examining whether economic evaluations really reflect individual 
preferences. 
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3. ECONOMIC EVALUATION IN HEALTH CARE 
Economic evaluations are used in health care since the market fails to achieve an optimal 
distribution of resources with competition on price. The aim is to help achieving optimal 
resource allocation given available resources. Resources for medical care are limited and 
choices must be made between alternative uses. The real cost of a health programme is the 
value of the benefits of another health programme that could have been implemented instead 
of the one that was funded. This is called the opportunity cost (Drummond et al. 2005).  Any 
medical decision entailing the use of resources implicitly excludes those resources from 
other possible uses (Weinstein and Fineberg 1980).  
Priorities among patients in the Norwegian health care system was recommended to be based 
on three dimensions according to the Lønning II- committee (NOU 1997:18). The two basic 
priority criteria are the severity of the health state and the expected health of a measure. In 
addition, the available resources should be used in the most cost-efficient way. In the earlier 
priority criteria in NOU 1987: 23, the severity of the health state was strongly emphasised. 
In the criteria from 1997 the committee pointed out that there are three relevant dimensions 
and in comparison with the earlier guiding principles the measures expected health and cost-
efficiency should be weighted more heavily (NOU 1997:18). The Patients Rights Law states 
that the patient has a right to necessary help from the special health services. The right is 
only valid if the patient has an expected health gain from the intervention and the costs are in 
a reasonable relationship to the effects of the intervention (Lov om pasientrettigheter LOV-
1999-07-02-63).   
Even though economic evaluation is only one of several considerations in priority decisions 
it is important because it can help identifying where the resources used give most effect in 
health outcomes. In a full economic evaluation both costs and consequences of the 
alternatives considered are examined. In addition, there is a comparison of two or more 
alternatives, since economic analysis is concerned with choices. If these two criteria are not 
fulfilled, the analysis can be a partial evaluation, for example a cost analysis which is only 
concerned about costs (Drummond et al. 2005). 
Consumer preferences of health care gains, to be used in economic evaluations, can be 
measured as a single common effect, for example life-years gained or cases detected in a 
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screening programme. It could also be measured as a set of health outcomes such as quality-
adjusted life-years (QALYs) or it could be measured in monetary units. 
There are three types of full economic evaluations that can be used as tools when we need to 
make priorities. When the output of the intervention is measured in natural units and a single 
common effect, a cost-effectiveness analysis (CEA) is used. In a cost-utility analysis (CUA) 
the output is measured as QALYs and one QALY represents one life year in full health 
(Dolan et al. 2005). Finally, when the consequences of a programme are measured in 
monetary units, a cost-benefit analysis (CBA) is the right tool. (Drummond et al. 2005).  
3.1 Welfare- and extra welfarist perspectives 
Underpinning the CBA is a branch of economics called welfare economics. Welfare 
economics can address normative issues because it includes value judgements as opposed to 
positive economics which address questions of how the world of economics functions in 
practise. The two value judgements in welfare economics are: 1) each member of society is 
contributing to the social welfare by their own welfare or utility and 2) individuals are the 
best to judge their own welfare. In addition, it is assumed that resource allocation is 
propelled by a competitive market in equilibrium and that the existing income distribution is 
suitable. These assumptions underlie two well-known principles. Alfredo Pareto worked out 
the first in the utilitarian tradition and stated that: A policy that makes one or more persons 
better off without making any other person worse off is an actual Pareto improvement. Two 
other economists stated another principle called potential Pareto improvement which is 
building on the first. It claims that if, in theory, gainers could compensate losers after a 
policy change then in total society has benefited. Since this compensation does not have to 
be paid, the principle can raise equity concerns. This last version of the Pareto principle was 
worked out by Nicholas Kaldor and John Hicks and it forms the foundation for CBA. Cost-
benefit analysis can be said to be the broadest measure of value of the three methods since it 
can allow for comparison with alternative programmes of value to society, outside the health 
care sector. (Drummond et al. 2005). The logical following from a CBA being based on 
welfare economics is that the method used in CBA, called willingness-to-pay (WTP) is 
based on the same approach. It aims at measuring the maximum amount an individual is 
willing to forgo in return for an intervention. An important consideration of this method is 
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that the level of wealth or ability to pay will be a precondition for what has to be forgone at 
the margin, to be willing to pay a certain amount of money. This implies that WTP will be 
greater among wealthier populations than among less wealthy populations, ceteris paribus 
(Birch and Donaldson 2003). WTP is a scale that cannot represent all values in life, only 
those that can be bought for money. The relationship between utility and crowns is the 
marginal utility of income, which can vary between individuals. It can even vary for the 
same individual if they are presented with large enough health gains (Gyrd-Hansen 2005). 
An opposing branch of economics is called extra welfarism. In extra welfarism, individual’s 
utilities are not considered enough for measuring social welfare. It introduces a non-utility 
view of quality of life in terms of relevant characteristics. The particular characteristics to be 
used instead of, or in addition to utilities remain unclear. How these should be incorporated 
for measurement alongside utilities is also discussed. One example of such a characteristic is 
health. For measuring the characteristic health, QALYs have been proposed. However, also 
in the different approaches of measuring QALYs, individuals’ preferences are used as a 
basis. The welfarist perspective is that health is incorporated in the individual’s utility 
function and what matters by an intervention is not what is produced by the particular 
intervention but whether the individual values what is produced (Birch & Donaldson 2003). 
The extra-welfarist perspective is to define the output of healthcare according to its 
contribution to health itself and not in terms of preferences for health compared to other 
goods. The other two full economic evaluations; CEA and CUA are based on the extra-
welfarist notion and CUA is seen as a special form of CEA in this context (Gyrd-Hansen 
2005). 
In a cost-utility analysis, the health benefit can be measured in number of QALYs gained. 
Every QALY represents one life year in full health and the QALY is a product of the value 
of health states and their duration (Dolan et al. 2005). The QALY model relates Q (health 
state) and t (lifetime) as follows: 
U(Q, t) = V(Q) * t 
This model implies that the utility of duration is linear and V (Q) is the correction factor for 
health state. The standard QALY calculation assumes risk neutrality with respect to life 
duration. This implies that when health quality is fixed, a certain lifetime with expected 
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duration t is rated as equal to an uncertain lifetime with the same expected duration t 
(Miyamoto et al. 1998).  
The number of QALYs gained for each individual is added according to the QALY 
maximisation rule. The rule states that the social value from a health benefit is the product of 
gains in quality of life, length of life and the number of patients treated. A recent review of 
QALY maximisation suggests that the QALY maximisation rule is not valid. The finding is 
that the social value is reduced in marginal increases in both quality and length of life. 
Reductions in health inequalities are appreciated and the social value seems to be increased 
if the persons who receive the QALYs have dependants and if they have a bad lifetime 
health prospect (Dolan et al. 2005).  
In a study by Rodríguez-Míguez and Pinto-Prades the importance of concentration and 
dispersion of individual health benefits was measured. They found that the respondents 
preferred to concentrate life-time increases under 9.1 years and to spread gains over this 
value in time. This can be illustrated in an indifference curve between U(t) and life-time 
increases (years) which at first is concave, until 9 years and then changes shape to become 
convex with increases in life-time years. The authors concluded that participants in their 
study prefer health programmes, which distribute life-years over a larger number of people if 
the gain to each recipient is sufficiently high. The threshold value for a gain to be considered 
sufficiently high was found to be 9.1 years of life prolongation. One important limitation of 
the study was the utilisation of a convenience sample of 61 undergraduate students who 
cannot be considered a representative sample of the whole population. Indeed, the authors 
stress the pilot nature of the study (Rodriguez-Miguez and Pinto-Prades 2002).  
3.2 WTP per QALY 
To increase the usefulness of the QALY, the possibility of establishing a link between WTP 
and QALYs have been proposed (Johannesson 1995). In recent years, there has been a 
debate on the possibility to establish a threshold value for a QALY and the theoretical issues 
that arises (Bleichrodt and Quiggin 1999;Dolan and Edlin 2002;Gyrd-Hansen 
2005;Johannesson 1995). The authors point to several obstacles in the establishing of this 
link. First, one might question whether the QALY is a valid utility function for an individual 
since it does not include decreasing marginal utility of health. If this requirement would be 
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fulfilled, a constant WTP per QALY require that marginal utility of income is constant 
among individuals. In WTP, the scale is in monetary terms but in QALY, a scale often used 
is time trade-off (TTO) in which the marginal utility of time is considered. The marginal 
utility of time can also vary between individuals (for example individuals with different life 
expectancy). These two measurements; marginal utility of income and time should be 
linearly related if a constant WTP for a QALY would be a precise estimation. If the QALY 
cannot be considered a measure of cardinal utility, or a measure of health (as in the extra 
welfarist perspective) the idea of a constant WTP per QALY is not realistic. However, even 
if a theoretical link between  CEA and CBA is not to be found, a more pragmatic view on 
the issue can include finding a threshold value for CEAs which cold be used for guiding 
decision-making in health care. A WTP per QALY based on individual preferences should 
not be applied as an absolute threshold, considering the weaknesses with the method, but 
could be used in guiding decision making. It might be an indicator of the cost per QALY is 
reasonable or if other considerations, not included from the individual perspective, could be 
additional reasons for implementing an intervention (Gyrd-Hansen 2005). 
3.3 Hypotheses 
My research question is:  
Is the relationship between utility and duration of life gain linear for increased lifetime 
up to one year? 
The main question can be formulated in two sub questions: 
a) Is the marginal utility of life duration constant up to one year? 
b) Is there a threshold value for a gain in life duration under one year? 
The zero hypotheses to be tested in this thesis are given in the following. The relationship 
between utility of a life gain and duration of a life gain is linear up to one year; the marginal 
utility of increased life duration is constant for values of (t) up to one year and there is no 
threshold value before a gain in lifetime is considered worthwhile.  
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Reasons for not believing that the utility over duration is linear and the marginal utility is 
constant are a diminishing marginal utility of length of life due to positive time preference, 
risk aversion or satiation. If there is a threshold value before a gain is considered 
worthwhile, it could disrupt a linear curve. 
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4. METHODS 
4.1 Research design 
Research can be said to be a decision process and the research design is a plan for this 
process. The choice of research design is in this case a cross sectional study. A cross 
sectional study includes data on specific dependent and independent variables from a 
randomly selected sample of units at one point in time. The data are mainly quantitative, 
from interviews, surveys or register data.  
In order to be able to generalize to the Norwegian population, a large representative sample 
was sought. Gallup Norway has a large, rather representative sample of the Norwegian 
population at their disposal and it is possible to select participants from relevant age groups. 
I chose to use Gallup for the data collection. This would save time compared to performing 
the study myself. The choice fell on an internet study because of budget constraints. An 
interview study would be much more costly with the same number of respondents. The aim 
was to include as many participants as possible within the budget constraint.  
Because I wanted the questionnaire distributed by Gallup to be as appropriate as possible for 
testing my hypotheses, I developed a questionnaire and performed a pilot study.  
4.2 Choosing the measurements 
4.2.1 Outcome measurements 
Increased lifetime is measured as te. The utility of te is defined as U. The point in time in the 
future when te will occur is defined as tp. One assumption is that the U (te) is dependent on tp  
The measurement of the utility of te can be conducted in different ways. The gain in 
longevity can be traded against other values as explained below. 
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Willingness-to-pay (WTP) 
A first option is WTP. This method implies asking respondents how much they are willing to 
pay for te. The utility of an increased lifetime (te) given tp can be derived from the amount 
that respondents on average are willing to pay. An argument against this method is the low 
convergent validity of explicit ranking of health care programmes and implicit ranking 
derived from WTP (Olsen et al. 2005). Another argument against the utilisation of WTP is 
that WTP can depend on the ability to pay. The latter argument might partly be controlled 
for if the respondents report their income in the study. In addition, the marginal utility of 
income can vary between individuals and it can vary with the size of the gain. Varying 
marginal utility of income between individuals is partly possible to correct with information 
on income.  
Time trade-off (TTO) 
A second option is TTO in which longevity can be traded against quality of life. In this case, 
the same reduction in quality of life to different te at different points in time, i.e. different 
values of tp should be considered. One argument against this method is that a described 
health status can be given different valuations from different respondents, in which case the 
responses cannot be compared between individuals. This could be partly controlled for if 
respondents report their health state. The valuation of a health state could also be non-linear 
with an increase in time. It is possible that being ill for a week is a possible endurable state 
but being in the same condition for years could be thought of as unbearable. 
Standard gamble (SG)  
A third way of eliciting preferences for te is to trade A) a certain low increase in te against B) 
a gamble of a risk of getting no increase in te and the possibility of receiving a larger gain of 
te than in A. The arguments against this method are that since most subjects cannot readily 
understand and utilise probabilities, the standard gamble method is often supplemented with 
visual aids, which can be difficult to achieve in a questionnaire. One-to-one, face-to-face 
interviews is the traditional method of obtaining SG measurements (Drummond et al. 2005). 
In addition, there is a possibility of measuring the willingness of risk taking behaviour 
instead of the U of (te). 
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A fourth option is to ask respondents of what gains in longevity they consider worthwhile 
without any costs. The argument against this option is that a utility-maximising respondent 
would accept all improvements in longevity no matter size of the gain. According to 
economic theory, an individual will choose the bundle of goods that maximizes his/her 
utility within a budget constraint (Stiglitz and Walsh 2002). 
The chosen option, given available resources, was to conduct a survey with a questionnaire 
containing questions which trade increases in lifetime (te) against money (WTP). A pilot 
study was conducted in December 2006, followed by the main survey in February 2007.  
4.2.2 Confounders and effect modifiers 
In addition to my interest in exploring the shape of the function U(te, tp), I had to try to 
control for other variables. There could be many sources of randomness in the sample. The 
individual life situation, the state of mind the respondent experienced at the time of the 
survey and biases resulting from the layout and wording of the questionnaire. 
Gallup had collected several variables concerning the life situation of the respondents. I used 
these to perform a stratified sampling with equal number of respondents from each age 
group and sex and to control for individual life situations in logistic- and linear regressions.  
4.3 Data analysis 
STATA was selected for the data analysis because the programme is powerful and suited for 
the intended analyses. I was also recommended to use STATA by my supervisors since it is 
broadly used by health economists.  
The data was sent from Gallup in four separate SPSS-files 02.03.2007. The SPSS files where 
converted to STATA files. 
Our sample from Gallup was deviant vis-à-vis the Norwegian population regarding the level 
of household income. In the sample, the median household income was slightly above NOK 
600 000. The median household income reported from Statistics Norway (SSB) for 2005 
was NOK 312 000. The median is chosen for comparison since it often gives a better view of 
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the general income level than the mean, which can be strongly influenced by extreme high or 
low incomes.  
Gallup reports that in all surveys there is an overestimation of level of income and education, 
which is a problem when comparisons against the general population are sought. To get very 
representative numbers, one has to stratify after income on telephone. SSB has studied the 
correlation between data from interviews and register data and reports that many respondents 
have problems in giving correct numbers. Many respondents do not know what other 
household members earn and many wish to give the impression of being close to what they 
think is the average household income.   
4.3.1 Developing a logistic regression model 
As the first step in the development of a model, I wanted to determine a set of likely 
predictor variables that could influence the tendency to accept the offer of life extension to 
the given price and the respondents’ WTP for life extension. Many different respondent 
characteristics were available from Gallup and from these, six were chosen for further 
analyses. The chosen variables were picked because they were thought to have the 
possibility to influence the respondents’ acceptance rates and WTP. These were: age, 
gender, level of education, household income, marital status and if the respondent is living 
with children under 15 years old.  
To indicate the potential application region for the model an examination was made on the 
chosen variables mean, standard deviation, minimum and maximum and a correlation matrix 
is made to be able to examine the simple relationships between the variables. There were no 
strong correlations found between pairs of independent variables. If there would have been 
strong correlations between two background variables this might have given a 
multicolinearity problem if they were both included as predictor variables in the model. 
Next, the different background variables were tabulated against the dependent variable 
“accepted_r” which represents the respondents yes/no answers to the offers of life extension. 
A logistic regression was made on each of the background variables and “accepted_r” in 
order to examine the separate background variables influences. The variables that showed a 
significant effect, given a p-value of 0.05, were household income (positive P=0.000), living 
with a co-habitee, vis-a-vis being married (negative P=0.020) and having a university level 
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of education vis-à-vis 9-years of compulsory school (positive P=0.012 and P=0.017 for 
education up to 4 years and over 4 years respectively). The income effect was as expected 
and the other relationships were not considered strong enough for the variables to be 
excluded from the model.  
Finally, the life extension offers in weeks was included in the model. The aim was to find 
out if different offers of life extensions, to the same price per week, could influence the 
tendency to accept. The same models were also divided in the two perspectives for when the 
life extensions would occur. The perspectives used in this study were the 1-year perspective 
and the 10-years perspective.  
Linear regressions were made on respondents WTP_week. The same model of background 
variables as in the logistic regression on acceptance rates was chosen as basis for the 
analysis. The different offers of life extensions were included in the model and the two 
perspectives: 1-year and 10-years were analysed separately.  
4.3.2 Further analyses 
For the results to be considered trustworthy, the respondents who had answered the different 
questionnaires could not be very deviant. Therefore, an overview of the respondents in the 
different questionnaires was made. The respondents were characterised and summarised by 
the chosen variables age, gender, level of education, household income, marital status and if 
they were living with children under 15 years old.  
The rate of acceptance for different offers of life extensions was analysed for the two 
perspectives to see if there were any differences in acceptance levels. 
A summation of the WTP per week, including median- and mean price per week for the 
different life extensions in the 1 year- and the 10-years perspectives was made. An analysis 
was also made that shows the number of respondents answering “yes” to the yes/no question 
of a predefined length of life extension to a given price (2500 NOK/week or 500 
NOK/week) depending on perspective (1 year or 10 years).  
The respondents who had answered that they did not want the life extension offer and who 
did not want to pay anything for it, i.e. with a zero WTP, were analysed with the intension of 
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finding out if this group had any tendency to become increasing or decreasing with longer 
life extension offers.  
The respondents were divided into four groups, depending on their internal pattern of 
maximum WTP/week for the three life extensions given in their questionnaires. The 
categories were labelled: L=linear, I=increasing, D=decreasing and U=uncertain. The 
category was determined by the respondents WTP/week. Analyses were made of 
respondents’ linearity and household income and of linearity and questionnaire (life 
extension offer). A new variable called WTP_capped was made which ignores the answers 
with the 5 % highest WTP/week. The reason was to try to avoid the extreme answers at the 
top of the data range. Corresponding regressions were made on WTP_capped as with 
WTP_week. 
A binomial test was performed on the rate of acceptance for different offers of life 
extensions to test the hypothesis of linear valuation of different life extension offers. Since 
the price per week was the same for the different life extension offers in the same time 
perspective; 1- or 10 years, the percentage acceptance would be the same in the same time 
perspective if respondents had a linear valuation. The mean percentage acceptance was used 
as the reference value, i.e. the basis for the expected value. The binomial test was chosen 
because it allows for tests of the proportion of successes on a two-level categorical 
dependent variable compared to a hypothesized value. The “yes” or “no” answers to the 
offers of life extensions match this description. The hypothesized value in this case is the 
mean value, calculated separately for the two perspectives.  
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Summary 
The utility of life years gained in economic evaluations of health care programmes has 
commonly been treated as a linear function of life years gained even though some empirical 
evidence suggest a diminishing marginal utility for lifetime. A power function with a factor 
less than 1 in the quality-adjusted life-years (QALY) model has been suggested to account for 
risk aversion and positive time preferences. 
  
In this study, the utility of gain in lifetime up to 1 year was examined in a random sample of 
2,400 Norwegians aged 40 to 59 years old. In hypothetical scenarios, respondents with 
untreated remaining lifetime of 1 or 10 years were offered treatment with a life gain ranging 
from 1 week to 1 year. The utility of the treatment was measured as willingness-to-pay (WTP) 
in an individual perspective.  
 
The majority of the results of this study indicate an increasing marginal utility for lifetime 
gains up to one year without a clear lower threshold value. If these results reflect the 
population’s preferences, the standard linear QALY model and the power QALY model 
previously proposed may yield misleading results for decision-making, and QALY weights 
obtained through TTO may be biased.  
 
Keywords: Utility measurement, Life years gained, QALYs, time trade-off 
 
 
 25
Introduction 
 
In economic evaluations, health gains can be measured in terms of a single common effect, 
for example life-years gained, a set of health outcomes such as quality-adjusted life-years 
(QALYs) or in terms of monetary units (Drummond et al. 2005). The utility function of life-
years and QALYs gained has been considered linear over time except that future gains have 
been discounted. The linearity in duration implies that a gain gives the same increase in utility 
regardless of the distribution of the gain among recipients. This assumption of linearity has 
been challenged for several reasons (Dolan et al. 2005;Olsen 2000;Williams 1997).  A non-
linear relationship would have implications for the results of economic evaluations using life-
years or QALYs as outcome measure. The standard linear QALY model is represented by: 
(1) U(q,t) = H(q) t 
where U and H denotes utility, q the health state (quality of life) and t a life year gain 
(Bleichrodt et al. 2005). 
 
If the time trade-off (TTO) method is used for valuing health states (q) individual time 
preferences will influence q. It is possible to account for varying time preferences by dividing 
the number of discounted life-years in full health by the number of discounted life years in the 
assessed health states (Johannesson et al. 1994). It is not clear, however, how this method can 
be used in programme evaluations, and the standard procedure is to discount QALYs at the 
social discount rate disregarding how the preference weights were obtained (Drummond et al. 
2005). Other time preferences are usually not taken into account when the quality weights are 
obtained. In the standard gamble (SG) method, the time considered (t) is usually the same in 
the alternatives between which the respondent has to consider. If individuals have different 
time preferences this does not bias the utility indifference in the alternatives (Drummond et al. 
2005). In contrast, if different values for t are used, such as the case with TTO, this can give a 
distorted preference weight if the marginal utility of time varies with duration.  
 
Assumptions in QALY calculations 
 
The estimation of QALYs is based on the theoretical framework of expected utility theory 
(EUT), even though there is clear evidence that individuals violate the theory. In EUT, utility 
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is a linear function of probability, but not of outcome if the individual is risk averse or risk 
seeking. The standard QALY model, however, implies risk neutrality (Johannesson et al. 
1994). Three conditions have been put forward for a risk neutral QALY to be a valid 
representation of individual preferences: (1) the utility of life years and quality are 
independent. The independence assumption implies that the shape of the utility function over 
life years will be the same for all health states; (2) the constant-proportional-trade-off property 
must hold which means that the proportion of remaining life that one would be willing to 
trade for a quality improvement is independent of remaining life years; (3) Individuals are risk 
neutral with respect to life time, which means that the utility function over life years is linear 
(Johannesson et al. 1994). If the last assumption is relaxed, a more general risk-adjusted 
QALY model is needed. General QALY models for use in cost-utility analyses, in which the 
assumption of linearity is loosened, exist. These models allow for curved utility functions for 
duration, but are rarely seen in economic evaluations (Abellán-Perpiñán et al. 2006;Doctor et 
al. 2004). A utility function for the risk-adjusted QALY, with weights derived from SG has 
been formulated as: 
(2) U(q,t) = H(q) tr 
If the weights have been derived from TTO, the corresponding equation was: 
(3) U(q,t) = [V(q) t] r 
where r is a risk aversion parameter and V is the value of any health state (q) (Johannesson et 
al. 1994). Under expected utility theory the power coefficient may reflect risk aversion (r<1; 
diminishing marginal utility) or risk neutrality (r=1) (Abellán-Perpiñán et al. 2006). In 1998, 
Miyamoto and co-workers questioned the assumption of linear utility over life duration. The 
authors suggest a revised QALY model, which relaxes the assumption of utility independence 
in the case of linear utility and replace it by standard gamble invariance in the case of 
nonlinear utility of life duration. This is achieved by the use of the zero-condition. This 
condition implies that when the survival time/life increase is zero, the health state does not 
matter. The authors suggest dropping the assumption of linearity and use an alternative model, 
which they call a generalized QALY model: 
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(4)  U(q, t) = H(q) W(t)  
W(0) = 0. W is the function that values life duration and does not have to be linear (Miyamoto 
et al. 1998). 
 
The authors of a recent paper on QALY models (Abellán-Perpiñán et al. 2006) examined the 
impact of utility curvature on TTO values. They state that if utilities derived from TTO were 
biased by a curved utility function then the algorithm used by EuroQol would also be biased. 
They tested the predictive validity of three different models: the linear-, the exponential- and 
the power QALY models. TTO was used to elicit preferences for health states. The aim was 
to examine possible differences between predicted and observed differences in values for t by 
different questions in two samples. The null hypothesis was that there is no significant 
difference between the values of t obtained by the two ways of measuring t for the linear 
model. The results showed significant differences for almost all health states tested when the 
linear model was used. The smallest differences were obtained by using the power QALY 
model. The linear QALY model is the most used in practice but the exponential and the power 
models have also been applied in medical decision-making (Abellán-Perpiñán et al. 2006). 
The findings Abellán-Perpiñán and co-workers present indicate that the power QALY model 
yields the best predictive validity, and the authors conclude that the best-fitted power 
coefficient is 0.65. This parameter indicates that the utility function for lifetime is concave; i.e. 
diminishing marginal utility of lifetime.  
 
Doctor and co-workers warn that most empirical tests of the standard QALY assumptions 
have given discouraging results which undermine the validity of QALYs as a base for medical 
decision making (Doctor et al. 2004). They performed a test of the QALY model, derived by 
use of the SG method based on nonexpected utility formulas, more precisely prospect theory. 
Doctor and co-workers tested the assumption of constant proportional coverage in a standard 
gamble experiment. Constant proportional coverage implies both constant proportional risk 
aversion and constant absolute risk aversion regarding duration risk. Only a linear utility 
model is consistent with both constant proportional and absolute risk aversion. Their results 
showed aversion to duration risk and at the same time support for the QALY model. These 
two findings should be mutually exclusive under expected utility theory. The authors 
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recommend that probability weighting and loss aversion should be taken into account when 
utilities for health care are computed. Prospect theory does not imply that the utility for 
duration is linear. In the study, the authors used three different power functions with r< 1, 
which all imply a concave function. Their values for t ranged from 0 to 20 years (Doctor et al. 
2004). Another study also found the utility function for duration to be a power function with a 
coefficient of about 0.7 (Bleichrodt and Pinto 2000).  
Valuation of short life extensions 
The values for t are normally given in years or in months and smaller t’s are usually not 
considered. In practice, however, most health interventions yield less than one year, 
frequently in the order of days and weeks (Wright and Weinstein 1998). In a recent review of 
QALYs and preferences, the results may indicate a threshold effect below which people 
consider the benefit too small to prioritise (Dolan et al. 2005). The hypothesis of a minimum 
lifetime/health gain below which people prefer to concentrate gains has been presented earlier 
(Olsen 2000) and there are some empirical evidence supporting a threshold value (Gyrd-
Hansen and Kristiansen 2007;Rodriguez-Miguez and Pinto-Prades 2002). In (Olsen 2000) and 
(Rodriguez-Miguez & Pinto-Prades 2002), the societal perspective is used for eliciting 
preferences, whereas in (Gyrd-Hansen & Kristiansen 2007), both the individual and the 
societal perspectives are used.  
 
In the present study, we will further explore the issue of a possible minimum threshold in an 
individual perspective. We will search for a threshold at lower levels, however, than is the 
case in previous research.  
 
If each individual had identical thresholds for appreciation of lifetime gains, this would be 
observed as a zero growth region in the beginning of the utility curve for duration. If the 
individuals had varying thresholds this would be observed as a slow growth region in the 
beginning of the marginal utility of lifetime up to one year. A faulty assumption of a linear 
utility function of lifetime in economic evaluations of health gains could lead to unintended 
and incorrect priorities and inefficient allocation of resources for at least two reasons. First, in 
the standard QALY model (1), the t value might be over- or under valued depending on the 
length of the lifetime gain considered. Second, if TTO is used for deriving the QALY weights, 
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these could be under- or over valued depending on the time periods used for eliciting the 
weights. TTO utilities could be biased upwards if the marginal utility for duration is 
increasing and downwards if it is diminishing (Miyamoto J M and Eraker A 1985). We 
wanted to test the assumption of a linear relationship between increases in lifetime and utility 
for increases in life duration up to one year. The increases considered were riskless and the 
utility was measured in willingness-to-pay (WTP). We tested the following hypotheses. The 
relationship between utility and duration of a life gain is not linear up to one year, individuals 
have an increasing or diminishing marginal utility of life extensions and individuals have a 
threshold for when a life gain is considered long enough for being valuable.  
 
Methods 
We used the internet-based panel of TNS Gallup Norway for the study. This panel 
encompasses 32 000 Norwegians aged 15 years and over. The panel members have 
volunteered to participate in surveys and they receive bonus points for participation. The 
points can be exchanged for gifts or donations to charities. A random sample from this panel 
was used in the main study, stratified by gender and age. 
 
We conducted a pilot study to test the appropriateness of the questions for valuing life 
extensions and to identify relevant prices per week of life extension. The respondents were 
asked to imagine that they had a disease that would give them only one year (tp=1) or 10 years 
(tp=10) to live (p =perspective). They were offered a treatment that would give them a 
specified increased lifetime, in addition to 1 or 10 years, denoted te (e = life extension). This 
notation is also used for the main study presented below. The sample in the pilot study 
consisted of 38 persons, 22 male and 16 female, in the age range from 23 to 85 years old. The 
respondents were employees at a physical therapy department, employees at a medical centre 
or friends or family of the author. The main questions concerned whether the respondent was 
willing to pay a price of  NOK 100 (≈€12) per week to increase their life expectancy. The 
price was set low to avoid that the respondents’ ability to pay would affect the results largely. 
The price per week was the same for the perspectives of 1 and 10 years. The results were 
analysed for mean and median WTP per week for different offers of life extensions. The 
values from the 50th percentile for tp=1 and the 46th percentile for tp=10 were used as the 
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prices for the offer of life extensions in the main study. From the percentile distribution of 
maximum WTP per week, a payment card was constructed that was used in the main study. 
 
The respondents in the pilot were asked to value only one single life extension (te) with two 
time perspectives (tp=1 and tp=10). Thus, it was not possible to perform analyses within the 
respondent, considering his/her linearity in WTP. In the main study, we limited each 
respondent’s perspective to either 1 or 10 years and increased the life extension offers (te), to 
three per respondent in order to analyse within-respondent responses. The respondents were 
asked to assume that the health state would be equal to their current state, also within the 
additional lifetime. 
 
We used a combination of closed-ended questions (yes/no) and a payment card with equal 
proportional increasing sums for the three different life extension offers that each respondent 
was given. The respondents were first asked to accept or reject an offer of life extension to a 
given price per week and thereafter to state their maximum WTP for the life extension, which 
could be higher or lower than the given offer. The price per week was set to NOK 2500 
(≈€300) for tp=1 and NOK 500 (≈€60) for tp=10. 
 
The main survey was performed in February 2007. The total number of respondents was 
limited to 2,400 for financial reasons, and the age of the respondents was 40-59 years old. We 
had four different questionnaire versions with 600 respondents for each. Each version had 
tp=1 or tp=10 and te=1 week, 1 month and 4 months, te=2 weeks, 2 months and 8 months or 
te=3 weeks, 3 months and 1 year (Appendix). From previous surveys, TNS Gallup had 
information on age, gender, level of education, household income, personal income, marital 
status and whether the respondent was living with children under 15 years old. Data were 
analysed in STATA/SE 9.2. Here, we used descriptive statistics, logistic regression, linear 
regression and binomial tests. 
  
Several types of responses were considered invalid and these responses were removed from 
further analyses. The respondents indicated on a 5-point scale how certain they were about 
their answers. Respondents who indicated “very uncertain”, were removed from further 
analyses concerning these answers (654 answers). This was done because we wanted to 
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reduce the level of uncertainty in the given answers. Respondents who had zero WTP for the 
life extension were asked to state a reason for their answer. If respondents had stated 
difficulties in relating to the question, (162 answers) these answers were removed. 
Respondents who had given explanations that were considered invalid, encompassing 
respondents who protested against the study design or gave answers such as “I mean the 
government should pay for health care” were considered not to have accepted or understood 
the preconditions in the study, and were removed (204 answers or 68 respondents). Illogical 
responses were also withdrawn. The answers were classified illogical if a respondent had been 
willing to pay an amount of money for a short life extension but nothing at all for a longer life 
extension (186 answers or 62 respondents). The total number of responses on the three WTP 
questions was 7,206. The number of omitted answers was 1,206 which leaved 6,000 (83%), 
for the analysis.  
 
The four respondent groups were similar in terms of age, gender, level of education, 
household income and marital status (Table 1). The rate of acceptance for different offers of 
life extensions was analysed for the two perspectives individually (Table 2). A binomial test 
was performed on the rate of acceptance for different offers of life extensions to test the zero 
hypothesis of a linear valuation of different life extension offers. We used logistic regression 
analysis to explore responses to the discrete choice question and linear regression analysis to 
explore the maximum WTP for additional lifetime. The two perspectives (tp=1 and tp=10) 
were tested separately. In these regressions, we had three responses for each respondent, and 
we consequently used a robust cluster technique to estimate confidence intervals of the 
regression model parameters. 
Results 
Responses to the dichotomous choice question 
 
In the 1-year perspective, 44 % of the respondents were willing to pay the stated price for 
one-week life extension with percentages of 51%, 53%, 57% and 59% for 2 weeks, 4 weeks, 
2 months, 4 months and 8 months, respectively. In the 10-years perspective, 53% were willing 
to pay the stated price for two weeks life extension with corresponding percentages of 57%, 
60%, 62%, 63% and 75% for 3 weeks, 2 months, 3 months, 8 months and 1 year. 
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 Because the price per week was kept constant (NOK 2500 for tp=1 and NOK 500 tp=10) in the 
different life extension offers (te), the percentage acceptance would be the same within each 
of the two time perspectives (tp) if the respondents had linear utility functions. The mean 
percentage acceptance was used as the reference value, i.e. the basis for the expected value. In 
the 1-year perspective, the mean rate of acceptance was 53% and in the 10-years perspective, 
it was 61%. The mean acceptance rates were used in the calculation of the expected value in 
the binomial tests. In the 1-year perspective, the offer of 1 week had a significantly lower rate 
of acceptance compared to the mean value ( p<0.001). The offer of 8 months had a 
significantly higher rate of acceptance (p=0.019). In the 10-years perspective, the offers of 2- 
and 3 weeks had significantly lower acceptance rates (p<0.001) and (p= 0.019) respectively. 
The offer of 1 year had a significantly higher rate of acceptance (p<0.001). 
 
There was no strong correlation between the independent variables included in the logistic 
regression model (-0.56< r<0.27). The odds for accepting the offer was increasing with 
increasing te from (odds ratio (OR) 1.367, 95% confidence interval (CI) 1.039-1.799, p=0.026) 
to OR=1.958, 95% CI 1.487-2.578, p<0.001 in the one year perspective. In the ten years 
perspective the OR was increasing from 1.217, 95% CI 0.923-1.603, p=0.163 to OR=3.182, 
CI 2.350-4.308, p<0.001 with increasing te (Table 3). This implies that the longer the life 
extension, the greater the odds that the respondent accepted the offer at a constant price per 
week. A part from life extension, household income was the only variable that was significant 
in both perspectives, 1 year OR=1.406, 95% CI 1.248-1.581, p<0.001 and 10 years OR=1.300, 
95% CI 1.140-1.483, p<0.001.  
For tp=1, men were less likely to accept an offer of life extension compared to women 
(OR=0.787, 95% CI 0.619-1.002, p=0.052). All increasing levels of education were positive 
in comparison to nine-year compulsory school, and all levels were significantly positive 
(OR=2.380, 95% CI 1.385-4.047, p=0.002), (OR=2.288, 95% CI 1.313-3.957, p=0.003) 
(OR=1.977, 95% CI 1.098-3.524, p=0.023). This implies that a respondent having more 
education than nine-year compulsory school seemed to be more likely to accept the offer of 
life extension. Household income was positive and significant which implies that the higher 
the level of household income, the higher was the probability for accepting the offer. 
Respondents being previously married were significantly more inclined to accept the offer 
compared to married (OR=1.875, 95% CI 1.199-2.983, p=0.006). The significant variables in 
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this perspective were life extension, household income, all levels of increasing education and 
being previously married. For tp=10, the results were a bit different. The significant variables 
in this perspective were life extension, household income, living with a partner (OR=0.553, 
95% CI 0.396-0.772, p<0.001) and age (OR=0.968, 95% CI 0.942-0.995, p=0.020). Gender, 
unmarried and respondents living with children under 15 years old were not significant in any 
of the perspectives. 
 
 The variable extension (life extension offer in weeks) was tested for interactions with the 
background variables. In the 1-year perspective, one significant interaction was found 
between extension and household income. The higher the income for the respondent, the more 
inclined was the respondent to prefer the longer life extension offers to the shorter life 
extension offers. In the 10-years perspective, a significant interaction was found, in addition 
to extension and household income, between extension and living with children under 15 
years old. Respondents who were living with children under 15 years old had a higher 
tendency to prefer longer offers of life extensions to shorter offers of life extensions.  
 
WTP for life extensions 
Both for tp=1 and tp=10 the mean WTP was indicating an overall decreasing trend, which 
might imply a diminishing marginal valuation of increasing life extension offers, but the trend 
was not clear. In the 10-years perspective there was a slight increase in WTP with the offers 
of 8 months and 1 year. In the 1-year perspective, the mean WTP of the 8 months offer is 
slightly higher than the 4 months offer. Deviant was also the offer of 2 weeks, which had a 
higher mean than the offer of 1 week, in the 1-year perspective. The standard deviations were 
high, and extreme values could easily affect the mean values in this analysis, which made the 
results uncertain (Table 4). The mean WTP per week life extension for tp=1 was NOK 4830 
(NOK 251 138 per year) and for tp=10 it was NOK 3367 (NOK 175 061 per year). The 
difference between perspectives corresponds to a discount rate of 4.1 %. 
 
An analysis of the WTP/week-answers revealed a decreasing share of respondents not willing 
to pay anything at all, with increasing life extension offers. For tp=1, the percentage 
respondents with zero WTP was 34% for 1 week, and for 8 months, the share had decreased 
to 15 %. For tp=10, the percentage respondents with zero WTP constituted 37% for 2 weeks 
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and 14% for 1 year. The share of respondents not willing to pay anything was decreasing with 
all offers of longer life extension in both the 1-, and the 10-years perspectives (Table 5). 
 
A linear regression was made of independent variables, the same as in the acceptance rate 
analysis, and maximum WTP/week for life extension offers. For tp=1, the significant variables 
were life extension 1 month, 2 months, 4 months and 8 months (from Coef. -1470, 95% CI -
2303-(-637), p=0.001 to Coef. -2498, 95% CI -3583-(-1413), p<0.001), university up to 4 
years (Coef. 2895, 95% CI 590.4-5200, p=0.014), upper secondary school (Coef. 1301, 95% 
CI 161.0-2440, p=0.025) and living with a partner (Coef. -1249, 95% CI -2352-(-147.2), 
p=0.026). The results indicated that the WTP/week was lower for the longer life extension 
offers, which opposes the results from the analysis of acceptance rates. Higher education 
seemed to indicate higher WTP/week compared to nine-year compulsory school. For tp=10, 
there was only one significant variable: 3 months life extension (Coef. -3835, 95% CI -7404-
(-265), p=0.035) which indicates that the offer of a life extension of 3 months had a lower 
WTP than the offer of 2 weeks (reference value) in price per week. Age, gender, university 
over 4 years, household income, unmarried, previously married and living with children under 
15 years old were non-significant variables in both perspectives. The included variables were 
tested for interactions and one significant interaction was found, between extension and living 
with a partner in the one year perspective. This finding was not considered a serious problem 
for the model (Table 6). 
 
The respondents were categorised in four groups, depending on their internal pattern of 
maximum WTP/week for the three life extensions given in their questionnaire. The categories 
were labelled: L=linear, I=increasing, D=decreasing and U=uncertain. Analyses were made of 
the connection between respondents’ linearity and household income and of linearity and 
questionnaire (life extension offer). A minority of the respondents were strictly linear in their 
WTP (32 %). The largest group was decreasing (37 %), 27% were increasing and 4% were 
classified as uncertain in their WTP for increasing life extensions. When the respondents were 
classified according to household income, a different pattern came up. In all income groups, 
except the group 400,000 to 599,999 and the highest income group (1,200,000 or more) the 
largest group of respondents were decreasing (D). In the group (400,000 to 599,999), the 
largest group was linear (L) and in the highest income group, the largest part was increasing 
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(I). There is a clear difference in the distribution of respondents between the lowest and the 
highest income groups. In the lowest group, the percentage decreasing respondents is 48%, 
21% are increasing and 25% are linear. In the highest income group, the percentage 
decreasing respondents is 32%, 35% are increasing and 28% are linear. In the two highest 
income groups: 1,000,000 to 1,199,000 and 1,200,000 or more, the percentage increasing 
respondents (I) was 35%. In the other groups taken together, the percentage was 26% (Table 
7). 
 
The presentation of distribution of linearity of respondents on the different questionnaires did 
not indicate any large differences. The percentage decreasing respondents varied between 
34% and 39% and the corresponding numbers for increasing respondents were 23% and 31% 
and for linear 30% and 35%. The only questionnaire which results were a bit different from 
the others was questionnaire nr 4 with life extension offers of 3 weeks, 3 months and 1 year, 
in a 10-years perspective. It had a lower percentage of decreasing and a higher percentage of 
increasing respondents in comparison to the average respondent in all questionnaires; (D) 34 
versus 37 and (I) 31 versus 27.  
 
Health states of respondents 
31.9% of the respondents considered their own health “very good” and 46.3% considered it 
“good”. 17.3% meant their health was “neither good nor poor”, 4.4% considered it “poor” and 
0.2% considered it “very poor”. In other words, over 75% of the respondents meant their 
health state was “very good” or “good” and fewer than 5% meant their health state was “very 
poor” or “poor”. The acceptance rates of the offers of life extensions were monotonically 
diminishing with inferior health state. Since the respondents with inferior health states were 
relatively few, their responses did not have any large influence on the overall results. The 
variable including the health states was non-significant both in the logistic-, and in the linear 
regressions and was omitted from the models. 
 
Discussion 
The results from this study indicate that people may have increasing marginal utility of small 
life year gains which would imply that the standard QALY model might be misleading for 
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priority setting. The results however, should be seen against the limitations of the study 
methodology. The WTP method was chosen over SG because the aim was to have a large 
representative sample of a general population and we wanted the questions to be easy to 
understand. SG questions are more complicated and resource demanding, and would ideally 
require personal interviews which would imply a smaller sample. Respondents have few 
problems in understanding WTP questions even if they can find them difficult to answer 
(Ryan et al. 2001). An argument against WTP is the low convergent validity of explicit 
ranking of health care programmes and implicit ranking derived from WTP (Olsen et al. 
2005). In this study, different health care programmes were not compared. The respondents 
were only faced with one life-extending treatment but with different gains in longevity. 
Another property of WTP is that the WTP depends on the ability to pay. The latter argument 
is partially controlled for, since the respondents report their income.  
 
The payment card (PC) and the closed-ended (CE) approaches of WTP, used in the main 
study have both given higher response rates, lower item non-response and fewer zero 
responses than the open-ended (OE) approach. Several studies have found evidence of “yea-
saying” with the CE approach and range bias with the PC approach (Ryan et al. 2001). The 
design in our study can give a “yea-saying” bias in the tendency to accept the offer of life 
extension but this effect would probably apply equally to all extensions and would therefore 
give a bias toward linearity in utility, which is the focus in our study. One recent study found 
support for the existence of range bias (Whynes DK et al. 2004) while another did not find 
any evidence for neither range nor mid-point bias (Ryan et al. 2004). In the case of range bias, 
which could give the respondents an increased tendency to relate their bids to the selected 
price range, this would not give a serious distortion in our case, again as the focus is on the 
linearity in WTP and less on the actual level of the bid. If there would be a range bias, this 
would probably move the results toward linearity in utility. 
 
A limitation of our study is that the offers of life extension were presented in the same order, 
from the shortest to the longest extensions, in all questionnaires. It would have been 
preferable to have the ordering of the questions randomised to reduce anchoring effects.  
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The Norwegian Ministry of Finance has indicated NOK 425,000 (in NOK 2005) as a value of 
a statistical life year to be used in analyses of mortality including mortality due to reduced 
health. This value could be quality adjusted by H(q) for relevant diseases 
(Finansdepartementet 2005). In accordance with the World Bank Group, a pragmatic 
limitation of the cost per QALY corresponding to the BNP per capita has also been suggested 
(NOK 350,000) (Kristiansen and Gyrd-Hansen 2007). These values are considerable higher 
than the WTP for a QALY obtained in this study. However, the offered price per week could 
have an anchoring effect and the range of values in the payment card could give a range bias. 
 
Positive time preferences and risk aversion both imply a diminishing marginal utility of 
lifetime in agreement with standard economic theory. Some of the results from this study 
suggest that the marginal utility for life extensions is increasing, as the acceptance rate for the 
longer life extension offers was higher than for the lower offers when the price per week was 
the same. If the marginal utility of lifetime was increasing up to 1 year, the utility function for 
duration would be convex up to this point in time. This result contradicts earlier suggestions 
of diminishing marginal utility of lifetime and a concave utility curve over life years due to 
risk aversion (Johannesson et al. 1994).  
 
The logistic regression models indicated an increasing valuation of life extensions with 
increasing lifetime offers. The results when the acceptance rates are analysed separately also 
indicated an increasing valuation of life extensions up to one year. The acceptance level 
increased with longer life extensions in both the 1-, and the 10-years perspectives. The 
increases in lifetime examined ranged from 1 week to 8 months when the life extension would 
occur in 1 year’s time and from 2 weeks to 1 year when the life extension would occur in 10 
years time. These findings indicate an increasing marginal utility for life gains up to one year. 
 
The results from the linear regression on maximum WTP/week indicated a diminishing 
marginal valuation for tp=1 in contrast to the acceptance rates analysed in the logistic 
regression which indicated an increasing marginal valuation both for tp=1 and tp=10. The 
results from the maximum WTP elicited by the payment card gave values with high standard 
deviations that make the mean values uncertain. The diminishing marginal valuation was 
significant for most life extensions when tp=1 but only for one of the five extensions for tp=10. 
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These results could reveal a reduced ability to pay when the life extensions became longer and 
the prices higher. An increasing marginal utility of income when higher prices are considered 
could have limited the possibility to increase the maximum WTP for the longer life extension 
offers in the majority of income groups. In the highest income group, 35% of the respondents 
had an increasing valuation of life extensions measured in maximum WTP and 32 % had a 
decreasing valuation. In the rest of the income groups, the overweight of respondents were 
decreasing in their maximum WTP per week. These results might indicate that when the 
income is on such a high level that the respondent did not need to consider it noteworthy, the 
valuation of life extension could be increasing. The results of the analysis of respondents with 
zero WTP support this interpretation. The share of respondents with zero WTP was 
decreasing with increasing life extension offers. 
 
No clear threshold value for when a gain in lifetime is considered worthwhile could be 
revealed, as the increases in acceptance rates were rather smooth. The answers on acceptance 
of different offers of life extensions showed a clear increasing trend for longer life extension 
offers in both the 1- and the 10-years perspectives. As the “yes”-answers increased from 44% 
to 58% for tp=1, when the offers increased from 1 week to 8 months and from 53% to 75% for 
tp=10 when the offers increased from 2 weeks to 1 year this could mean that the respondents 
had different threshold values. The offer of 1 week was the only offer given in the study with 
an acceptance level under 50% if one would like to choose this as a threshold value. However, 
the trend of increasing acceptance for longer life extensions as well as the declining level of 
respondents not willing to pay anything when offers of life extensions were increased, both 
point to individual thresholds. The share of respondents who answered “benefit not large 
enough” among those not willing to pay anything was decreasing with longer life extension 
offers in both perspectives. As the increases and decreases were rather smooth, one 
interpretation of this could be that the respondents were quite spread in where they had a 
threshold between 1 week and 1 year of life extensions. 
 
In previous studies, the increases in lifetime evaluated have usually been longer time periods 
than in our study. In Johannesson and co-workers study, the life years considered were 1-10 
years, in a paper of Dolan and Jones-Lee the authors examined whole life years and in the 
study by Rodríguez-Míguez and co-workers the values for lifetime increases ranged from 1 to 
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50 years (Dolan and Jones-Lee 1997;Johannesson et al. 1994;Rodriguez-Miguez & Pinto-
Prades 2002). In other studies the range of values for lifetime has comprised shorter time 
periods as in the study by Abellán-Perpiñán and co-workers where a reference period of 10 
years was used for chronic health states and months were used for nonchronic health states 
(Abellán-Perpiñán et al. 2006). Doctor and co-workers used lifetime periods that ranged from 
0 to 20 years in their study for a test of the QALY model derived by SG and in the discrete 
choice experiment by Gyrd-Hansen and Kristiansen, the life increases considered ranged from 
1- to 180 months (Doctor et al. 2004;Gyrd-Hansen & Kristiansen 2007) .  
 
The results of this study indicate an increasing marginal utility for lifetime up to one year and 
oppose a power function for t with a coefficient r <1. A power function for t with a coefficient 
r <1 in a general QALY model has been suggested by several authors: 
U(q,t) = H(q)t r 
 (Abellán-Perpiñán et al. 2006;Bleichrodt & Pinto 2000;Doctor et al. 2004). The power 
QALY model proposed (r =0.65), indicate that the utility function for life duration is concave 
rather than linear (Abellán-Perpiñán et al. 2006). Since the life extensions in our study were 
relatively short, this might imply that the utility function for life duration has a shape that is 
convex in the beginning (up to one year) and then becomes concave at a later point in time.  
 
If the utility function for duration is not linear but has an increasing marginal utility in the 
start, this can affect economic evaluations in health care at different levels. First, in the 
derivation of QALYs by use of the TTO method, this implies that the trade-offs in time have 
varying marginal utility depending on the length of the time period considered. If variations in 
marginal utility of time are not taken into account, TTO can give biased health state 
valuations. The same argument can apply to the SG method if the questions involved for 
deriving the quality weights involve gamble questions varying in survival duration. If all 
survival duration in the gamble considered are over 1 year, this argument might not be valid. 
Second, in the QALY formula:  
U(q, t) = H(q) W(t)  
(t) might in reality neither have a linear function, nor an exponential- or power coefficient but 
a different shape which allows for an increasing marginal valuation of duration up to one year. 
Third, this could affect also cost-effectiveness analyses using life years gained as outcome 
 40
measure. Four, when incremental cost/QALY or incremental cost/life years gained is 
measured, the incremental time gain might be valued differently if one considers it from time 
zero or if it is added to other treatments, which also give gains in lifetime.  
 
The above presented arguments concern the methods in economic evaluations including 
duration in their formulas. Further questions concern if, and how these concerns should be 
taken into account in resource allocation decisions.  
Conclusion  
 
Most respondents were not strictly linear in their valuation of increased lifetime. The majority 
of the results of this study indicate that respondents had an increasing marginal utility for 
lifetime up to 1 year. No minimum threshold value was found for the value of lifetime. A 
gradually increasing tendency to accept longer offers of life extensions indicate individual 
thresholds up to one year. In the highest income group, an overweight of respondents had an 
increasing valuation of longer life extensions when the outcome measure was maximum 
WTP/week. The proportion of respondents not willing to pay anything was decreasing with 
all offers of longer life extensions and the proportion of respondents who answered “benefit 
not large enough” among those with zero WTP was decreasing with longer life extension 
offers. On the contrary, it cannot be excluded that a decreasing mean of maximum WTP/week 
in the majority of respondents could mean a diminishing marginal utility of lifetime up to 1 
year. 
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Table 1. Characteristics of respondents by type of questionnaire 
 
Questionnaire 1 2 3 4 Total
Number of 
respondents 
600 600 602 600 2402
Age (mean)  
Min 
Max 
49.1 
40 
59 
49.1
40
59
48.8
40
59
49.3
40
59
Female (%) 49.7 50.0 48.7 49.5  
Education (%)  
Nine years 
Secondary 
Univ ≤ 4y 
Univ > 4y 
 
5.67 
39.8 
32.2 
22.3 
6.00
39.0
31.5
23.5
6.64
42.9
29.6
20.9
7.33
39.3
29.8
23.5
6.41
40.3
30.8
22.6
Household Inc (%) 
< 200 000 
2-400 000 
4-600 000 
6-800 000 
8-1 000 000 
1- 1 200 000 
>1 200 000 
 
2.00 
18.5 
28.7 
29.0 
14.5 
3.50 
3.83 
2.17
16.5
29.8
30.2
15.2
3.17
3.00
2.82
15.3
30.1
32.6
11.6
4.49
2.33
2.50
18.3
26.8
33.2
11.3
4.83
3.00
2.37
17.2
29.1
31.2
13.2
4.00
3.04
Marital status (%) 
Married 
Partner 
Unmarried married 
Previously married 
 
65.5 
12.3 
10.8 
11.3 
64.2
13.7
9.50
12.7
64.2
14.3
7.82
13.6
63.8
12.8
10.8
12.5
64.4
13.3
9.75
12.5
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Table 2. Proportions accepting an offer of life extensions for a fixed amount per week 
(NOK 2500 per week with one year perspective and NOK 500 in 10 years perspective).  
 
 N Yes 95 % CI 
Life expectancy without treatment= 1 year 
1 week 512 44.3 % (40.1; 48.4 %) 
2 weeks 497 51.3 % (46.9; 55.5 %) 
4 weeks 509 52.5 % (48.1; 56.6 %) 
2 months 495 56.8 % (52.3; 61.0 %) 
4 months 510 57.5 % (53.1; 61.6 %) 
  
Life 
extension 
with 
treatment1
8 months 495 58.6 % (54.3; 62.8 %) 
Life expectancy without treatment = 10 years 
2 weeks 490 53.3 % (48.8-57.6 %) 
3 weeks 490 56.5 % (52.0-60.6 %) 
2 months 517 60.0 % (55.7; 64.0 %) 
3 months 486 62.3 % (58.0; 66.5 %) 
8 months 505 63.2 % (59.0; 67.1 %) 
 
Life 
extension 
with 
treatment2
1 year 481 74.8 % (70.9; 78:4 %) 
 
 Total 5 987 57.5 %
 
Table 3. Logistic regression of responses to an offer of life extensions for a fixed amount 
per week (NOK 2500 or NOK 500) 
 
 
 
 
Perspective = 1 year 
918 clusters in respid 
Perspective = 10 years 
911 clusters in respid 
Explanatory variables   Odds 
Ratio 
   
P>|z| 
[95% Conf. 
Interval] 
 Odds 
Ratio 
   
P>|z| 
[95% Conf. 
Interval] 
Age (in years) 0.995 0.709 (0.970; 1.021) 0.968 0.020 (0.942; 0.995) 
Gender (0=female, 
1=male)    
0.787 0.052 (0.619; 1.002) 0.913 0.471 (0.712; 1.170) 
Level of education   
Nine years (reference) 1  1  
Upper second. 2.380 0.002 (1.385; 4.047) 0.743 0.268 (0.440; 1.257) 
Univ. max 4y 2.288 0.003 (1.313; 3.957) 0.784 0.388 (0.451; 1.362) 
Univ over 4y 1.977 0.023 (1.098; 3.524) 0.734 0.293 (0.413; 1.306) 
Household income (7 
levels3) 
1.406 0.000 (1.248; 1.581) 1.300 0.000 (1.140; 1.483) 
Marital status   
                                                 
1 Price per week NOK 2500 
2 Price per week NOK 500 
3 Household income in NOK, level 1: < 200 000, level 2: 200 000-399 999, level 3: 400 000-
599 999, level 4: 600 000-799 999, level 5: 800 000-999 999, level 6: 1 000 000-1 999 999, 
level 7: ≥1 200 000 
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Married (reference) 1  1  
Partner 1.009 0.963 (0.716; 1.419) 0.553 0.000 (0.396; 0.772) 
Unmarried 0.895 0.737 (0.446; 1.771) 0.919 0.828 (0.441; 1.961) 
Previously m 1.875 0.006 (1.199; 2.983) 1.504 0.120 (0.900; 2.514) 
Living with children < 
15 years (0=no, 1= yes) 
1.108 0.476 (0.835; 1.471) 0.794 0.145 (0.582; 1.083) 
Life   extension    
1 week 1 (reference) Not included in 10 years persp. 
2 weeks 1.367 0.026 (1.039; 1.799) 1 (reference) 
3 weeks Not included in 1 year perspective 1.217 0.163 (0.923; 1.603) 
1 month 1.420 0.000 (1.236; 1.633) Not included in 10 years persp. 
2 months 1.780 0.000 (1.299; 2.250) 1.342 0.000 (1.176; 1.532) 
3 months Not included in 1 year perspective 1.596 0.001 (1.206; 2.111) 
4 months 1.762 0.000 (1.458; 2.128) Not included in 10 years persp. 
8 months 1.958 0.000 (1.487; 2.578) 1.611 0.000 (1.324; 1.960) 
1 year Not included in 1 year perspective 3.182 0.000 (2.350; 4.308) 
 Log pseudolikelihood =  
-1746.4205  
Pseudo R2 = 0.0454 
Log pseudolikelihood =  
-1636.1753 
Pseudo R2 = 0.0429 
 
 
Table 4. Maximum WTP (NOK, NOK8 ≈€1) per week life extension  
 
 
 
Median 
WTP/week 
(NOK) 
Mean 
WTP/week 
(NOK) 
Min Max Std. Dev. 
1 year:  
1 week 
 
500 
 
6393 
 
0 
 
   500 000 25 358
2 weeks 2 500 8835 0 1 000 000 55 308
4 weeks 2 500 4184 0    125 000   8 540
2 months 2 500 3366 0      62 500   5 045
4 months 2 500 2958 0      62 500   4 790
8 months 2 500 3283 0    100 000   7 418
10 years:  
2 weeks 
 
500 
 
5696 
 
0 
 
500 000 36 280
3 weeks 500 2227 0 50 000   4 643
2 months 500 3982 0 1 000 000 44 279
3 months 500 1403 0 10 000   2 416
8 months 500 3326 0 1 000 000 44 567
1 year 500 3519 0 1 000 000 45 517
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Table 5. Percentage of respondents with zero WTP for the different offers and number 
of respondents who answered “benefit not large enough” among those with zero WTP 
Offer of life extension N Percentage zero 
WTP/week
Benefit not 
large enough 
Perspective 1 year: 1 week 514 34.2 112 
2 weeks 496 28.4 85 
4 weeks 514 25.9 81 
2 months 496 23.4 68 
4 months 515 19.0 54 
8 months 497 14.9 27 
  
Perspective 10 years: 2 weeks 493 36.5 135 
3 weeks 496 33.5 109 
2 months 520 29.6 112 
3 months 487 27.1 88 
8 months 504 19.1 70 
1 year 482 13.7 36 
 
 
Table 6. Linear regression of maximum WTP per week life extension  
 Perspective = 1 year 
933 clusters in respid 
Perspective = 10 years 
928 clusters in respid 
Explanatory variables   Coef.    P>|t| [95% Conf. 
Interval] 
Coef.   P>|t| [95% Conf. 
Interval] 
Age (in years) 82.66 0.419 (-117.9; 283.2) 2.459 0.990    (-365; 370.3) 
Gender (0=female, 
1=male)    
1068 0.173 (-467.9; 2606) -1619 0.588 (-7487; 4249) 
Level of education   
Nine years (reference) 1  1  
Upper second. 1301 0.025 (161.0; 2440) 909.0 0.358 (-1031; 2849) 
Univ. max 4y 2895 0.014 (590.4; 5200) 780.4 0.761 (-4262; 5823) 
Univ over 4y 765.0 0.539 (-1676; 3206) 3977 0.206 (-10138; 2185) 
Household income (7 
levels4). 
1305 0.058 (-44.08; 2656) 4953 0.127 (-1416; 11322) 
Marital status   
Married (reference) 1  1  
Partner -1249 0.026 (-2352; -147.2) 5860 0.371 (-6978; 18698) 
Unmarried 1448 0.416 (-2044; 4940) 22305 0.185 (-10696;55307) 
Previously m 839.0 0.364 (-974.0; 2652) 6306 0.144 (-2148; 14761) 
Living with children < 
15 years (0=no, 1= yes) 
1846 0.217 (-1085; 4777) -2626 0.274 (-7333; 2080) 
                                                 
4 Household income in NOK, level 1: < 200 000, level 2: 200 000-399 999, level 3: 400 000-
599 999, level 4: 600 000-799 999, level 5: 800 000-999 999, level 6: 1 000 000-1 999 999, 
level 7: ≥1 200 000 
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Life   extension    
1 week 1 (reference) Not included in 10 years persp. 
2 weeks 2794 0.283 (-2315; 7903) 1 (reference) 
3 weeks Not included in 1 year perspective -2070 0.104 (-6553; 612.7) 
1 month -1470 0.001 (-2303; -637) Not included in 10 years persp. 
2 months -1948 0.002 (-3208; -688) -942 0.511 (-3760; 1874) 
3 months Not included in 1 year perspective -3835 0.035 (-7404; -265) 
4 months -2498 0.000 (-3583; -1413) Not included in 10 years persp. 
8 months -2009 0.004 (-3379; -640) -1505 0.365 (-4759; 1750) 
1 year Not included in 1 year perspective -1495 0.607 (-7197; 4207) 
 Prob > F      =  0.0000 
R-squared     =  0.0150 
Prob > F      =  0.0003 
R-squared     =  0.0267 
 
Table 7. The relationship between household income and linearity in max WTP (NOK, 
NOK8 ≈€1) within the respondent5 
  
Yearly 
household 
income before 
taxes            
in NOK 
D 
 
Decreasing 
I 
 
Increasing 
L 
 
Linear 
U 
 
Uncertain Total 
under 200,000  23 10 12      3  48  
                       47.9%    20.8%  25.0%  6.3%  100%  
200,000 to 
399,999  
139     81 111  10  341  
                       40.8%   23.8% 32.6%    2.9%  100%  
400,000 to 
599,999  
197    141 201       23  562  
                       35.1%     25.1%       35.8%    4.1%  100%  
600,000 to 
799,999  
214      166      187     31  598  
                       35.8%       27.8%       31.3%      5.2%  100%  
800,000 to 
999,999  
93     71      88       8  260  
                       35.8%      27.3%     33.9%        3.1%  100%  
1,000,000 to 
1,199,000  
32       26    12   4  74  
                       43.2%      35.1%   16.2%    5.4%  100%  
1,200,000 or 
more  
18       20      16     3  57  
                       31.6%      35.1%     28.1%      5.3%  100%  
Total  716       515 627       82  1,940  
                       36.9%      26.6% 32.3%        4.2%  100%  
 
                                                 
5 Each individual responded to three different offers. The responses to these three will indicate Decreasing 
marginal utility of life years, constant marginal utility and Linear utility function, Increasing marginal utility or 
Uncertain if the respondent is both decreasing and increasing.  
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Figure 1. Proportion accepting offer according to life extension (NOK 2500 in 1 year 
perspective and NOK 500 in 10 years perspective)  
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Figure 2. Proportion with zero WTP according to life extension 
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Appendix 
Questionnaire 1 
Valuation of life extension treatments 
 
 
Dear respondent, 
 
Decision makers in the health care service are increasingly frequent put in situations where 
they have to choose between treatment options and make priorities. The aim with this survey 
is to give society a better foundation for priorities and choices. In the following, we will ask 
you to imagine yourself in a situation where you have to pay for the treatment yourself. The 
aim with the study is not to introduce self-financing for medical treatment. The aim is to find 
out how much you valuate different possible life extending treatments. 
 
The situation in the questions is hopefully far from your present life and we ask you therefore 
to consider the questions carefully before you answer. We ask you to consider the life 
extension you will achieve by taking the treatment and how much you would be willing to use 
from your own or your family’s budget. 
 
One year left to live 
Imagine that you go to your general practitioner (GP). The GP tells you that you have a 
serious disease with expected lifetime of 1 year from today. The physician can offer you an 
injection against the disease. The injection is taken once. The treatment will give muscular 
tenderness and a little stiffness at the place of the injection for a couple of days but no other 
side effects.  
 
Treatment a) If you take his treatment you will expect to extend your lifetime with about 1 
week in the same health state as today. It will cost NOK 2 500 and you have to pay the 
amount yourself.  
 
Would you have 
taken the treatment? 
                                                           
Yes              No                
 
What would you be willing to pay as a maximum for such a treatment? Please mark the 
alternative that suits you best or state another sum. 
 
       NOK 0  
       NOK 100  
       NOK 1 000  
       NOK 2 500  
       NOK 5 000  
       NOK 10 000  
       NOK 15 000  
     At maximum I would be willing to pay                                      NOK  
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How certain are 
you on your 
answers? 
                                                                      
Very certain                                                    Very uncertain 
 
If you answered you did not want treatment a to the given price and you did not want to pay 
anything for it, please mark one of the boxes below: 
 
 
  This treatment has no value to me 
  I cannot afford the treatment 
  I don’t think the benefit is large enough 
  I think it is difficult to relate to the question  
  Other reason (please explain) 
 
 
Treatment b) Imagine the situation is the same (one year left to live), but the treatment will 
extend your lifetime with about 4 weeks in the same health state as today. The treatment costs 
NOK 10 000 and you have to pay the amount yourself.  
.  
Would you have accepted 
this treatment? 
                                                           
Yes               No                 
 
What would you be willing to pay as a maximum for such a treatment? Please mark the 
alternative that suits you best or state another sum. 
 
      NOK 0  
      NOK 400  
      NOK 4 000  
      NOK 10 000  
      NOK 20 000  
      NOK 40 000  
      NOK 60 000  
     At maximum I would be willing to pay                                      NOK  
 
 
How certain are 
you on your 
answers? 
                                                                      
Very certain                                                    Very uncertain 
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Treatment c) Imagine the situation is the same (one year left to live), but the treatment will 
extend your lifetime with about 4 months in the same health state as today. The treatment 
costs NOK 40 000 and you have to pay the amount yourself. 
 
Would you have accepted 
this treatment? 
                                                           
Yes               No                 
 
What would you be willing to pay as a maximum for such a treatment? Please mark the 
alternative that suits you best or state another sum. 
      NOK 0  
      NOK 1 600  
      NOK 16 000  
      NOK 40 000  
      NOK 80 000  
      NOK 160 000  
      NOK 240 000  
     At maximum I would be willing to pay                                      NOK  
 
 
How certain are 
you on your 
answers? 
                                                                      
Very certain                                                    Very uncertain 
 
 
If you answered you did not want treatment c to the given price and that you did not want to 
pay anything for it, please mark one of the boxes below: 
 
  This treatment has no value to me 
  I cannot afford the treatment 
  I don’t think the benefit is large enough 
  I think it is difficult to relate to the question 
  Other reason (please explain) 
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Your current health state 
 
How do you consider your own general health? 
 
 
   Very good 
   Good 
   Neither good nor poor 
   Poor 
   Very poor 
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 I CONSTRUCTION OF THE QUESTIONNAIRE 
I.1 Construction of the WTP question. 
I.1.1 Fixed price per week and varying length of the offer. 
By asking the respondent, the same question with varying life extension but with equal price 
per week I would expect the same ratio between yes and no if the valuation is linear.  
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Figure 1 Linear willingness to pay for increasing weeks of life gain. Left graph shows WTP as amount. 
Right graph shows ratio of Yes to No if offered extensions with equal price per week. 
 
A threshold in the valuation of short extensions should result in fewer people answering yes 
to the shorter extensions than to the longer ones.  
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Figure 2 Threshold in the willingness to pay for increasing weeks of life gain. Left graph shows WTP as 
amount. Right graph shows ratio of Yes to No if offered extensions with equal price per week. 
 
By comparing the ratios of acceptance, I can evaluate whether there is a threshold and 
possibly try to locate it. 
 
The fixed price question could show false results if different extensions would result in 
different distributions of WTP. Thus, I have included a question to find each individual’s 
WTP for each offer. Specifically I am interested in how many who don’t value the offer at all 
and the change in the high WTP that could be an effect of limits in disposable income. 
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I.1.2 Cheap talk protocol 
Questions on willingness to pay for health are difficult to formulate and the respondents’ 
context is highly variable. In order to try to start all the respondents in the same context I have 
designed a short introduction which sets the scene. 
 
I.1.3 Bias towards linearity 
I want to test my hypothesis that willingness to pay is non-linear with regards to time. 
Therefore I have constructed the questionnaire with a bias towards linearity. If a respondent 
chooses the middle values or the same numbered option in each of the three questions this 
will be a linear response. There is thus a larger probability for false positives for linearity than 
for non linearity and this should result in a stronger test for my hypothesis.  
 
I.1.4 Within subjects and between subjects analysis 
Each subject is given three different offers. Thus each respondent may be tested for linearity. 
There are four editions of the questionnaire with different combinations of extensions and 
perspectives. Through between subjects analysis I can test a range from 1 week to close to a 
year in both 1 year and 10 years perspective.  
I.1.5 Internal consistency checks 
Checks for protests and uncertainties are implemented through two questions of whether the 
respondents are certain of their answer and a possibility to answer why he did not want the 
offer.   
 
In addition, the respondent should give an increasing utility (increasing amounts in the 
willingness to pay question) to increasing offers. If the respondent answers with declining 
utility, this is considered inconsistent. 
I.2 Pilot study 
A pilot study was conducted in order to identify practical problems in the study. The aim was 
to collect standardised data of high quality and to avoid having to change the main study 
when it was underway. The pilot study was also intended to give answers concerning the 
overall quality of the questionnaire and the accuracy of the range of numbers used in it.  
 
Six different versions of a questionnaire were filled in by a sample of 38 respondents in total. 
The respondents were collected from three different groups and responded on a voluntary 
basis. The first group consisted of employees at the Physical therapy department at Akershus 
University Hospital, the second group consisted of employees at the Interventional Centre at 
Rikshospitalet and the third group consisted of friends and family of the author. From the first 
two groups, around 1/3 of the available respondents in each group filled in the questionnaire. 
The questionnaires were distributed in the break rooms at the departments and were to be 
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placed in an allotted envelope after they had been filled in. It was anonymous and respondents 
were registered by a number.  
 
The questionnaire consisted of one part of background variables and one part with two main 
questions. The main questions concerned whether the respondent was willing to pay a price of 
100 NOK per week to increase their life expectancy. The price was set low because the aim 
was to avoid the respondents’ ability to pay to affect the results to a large extent.  The 
described scenarios explained that the respondent had got a disease which gave him/her only 
one more year to live in question a) and only 10 more years to live in question b). The 
respondents were offered an injection which could increase their life expectancy by a 
specified amount of time. The different questionnaires had different life increases, as seen 
below. The price/week was the same for the perspectives of 1 and 10 years. Some respondents 
were classified as invalid in the analysis because of answers like: “I am willing to pay a lot” 
but did not give a figure. They were also withdrawn if they had refrained from answering 
“yes” or “no” to the question of whether they would accept the injection but had written that 
they were uncertain. 
Questionnaire Perspective 1 year 
Perspective
10 years 
Number of 
respondents
Number of 
valid 
answers 
1 1 week 1 week 8 8 
2 2 weeks 2 weeks 5 5 
3 1 month 1 month 5 5 
4 3 months 3 months 5 5 
5 6 months 6 months 8 6 
6 1 year 1 year 7 5 
   38 34 
Table 1 Combinations of life extension and perspective in the 6 questionnaires 
The results revealed a mean willingness to pay (WTP) per week as seen below: 
 
Life 
extension 
1 week 2 weeks 1 month 3 months 6 months 1 year 
1 year left 3 400 2 575 12 906 11 083 3 269 3 077 
10 years left 1 900 25 1 220 4 250 1 362 3 397 
Table 2 Mean willingness to pay in NOK per week of life extension 
 
There were a few answers on 1 week and 3 months with values far over the others that 
affected the mean values. When the number of respondents is low, the mean values are easily 
affected by the highest and lowest values. The median (50th percentile) WTP per week 
extension was 2500 NOK for the 1-year perspective and the 46th percentile WTP per week 
prolongation was 500 NOK for the 10 year perspective. The 46th percentile value was selected 
because of the round figure instead of the 50th percentile.  
From the values in the pilot study, a payment card was constructed to be used in the main 
study.  
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Price per week 
In NOK for  
1-year perspective 
Percentile Price per week 
In NOK for  
10 year perspective
Percentile
0 0-2 0 0-6 
100 3-17 100 29-39 
500 Ca 24 150 Ca 41 
1000 29 250 46 
1500 33 350 Ca 49 
2500 50 500 Ca 55 
5000 70 1000 71 
10000 80-87 5000 Ca 84 
15000 90 10000 Ca 94 
Table 3 Selected payment cards for each perspective and corresponding percentiles 
 
Since the respondents only had one life extension to consider, with two perspectives (1 and 10 
years) it was not possible to perform analysis within the respondent, considering his/her 
linearity in WTP. In the main study, we limited each respondent’s perspective to either 1 or 
10 years and increased the life extensions to three per respondent in order to be able to make 
analysis also within the respondent. 
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II DATA COLLECTION 
The main survey was performed in February 2007 by Gallup, Norway. The total number of 
respondents was 2400 and they were divided in four groups, which each received a different 
questionnaire, answered by 600 persons. The respondents were 40-59 years old. This age 
group was chosen since they were thought to be more likely to have reflected upon life/death 
and disease questions than younger persons and these questions would probably seem more 
relevant to an older respondent. The limit of 59 years was chosen because we wanted all 
respondents to be able to understand and answer the questions. The four questionnaires 
differed in life extensions and perspectives as seen below: 
 
Questionnaire Question a) Question b) Question c) Perspective Price per 
week in 
NOK 
1 1 week 1 month 4 months 1 year 2500 
2 2 weeks 2 months 8 months 1 year 2500 
3 2 weeks 2 months 8 months 10 years 500 
4 3 weeks 3 months 1 year 10 years 500 
Table 4 Combinations of life extensions and perspectives in the 4 questionnaires used in the Gallup survey 
 
The life extensions in question a) are multiplied by four for questions b) and c) and the price 
per week is constant in each questionnaire. The four different questionnaires were sent to 
Gallup Norway who performed the data collection. They distributed the questionnaires to the 
relevant age group on the internet. When the agreed upon number of respondents had 
responded, i.e. 600 for each questionnaire, the link to the questionnaires was closed.  
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III DETAILED DATA TRANSFORMATION 
The data was sent from Gallup in four separate SPSS-files 02.03.2007. As STATA cannot 
import SPSS-files directly, the import had to be done through an intermediate file and some 
manual steps. The files were exported from SPSS as SAS transport format and imported into 
STATA using the command fdause. Some of the variable names were renamed into slightly 
shorter and more consistent forms and the original descriptions of the variables from the 
SPSS-files were added. The questionnaire alternatives were coded by label define to relate the 
values to the corresponding answers and then the correct labels were attached to the variables 
by label values. This process was repeated for each questionnaire. The answers from the 
different questionnaires were saved as g1, g2, g3 and g4. 
 
In the original SPSS-files, not all respondent characteristics that I wanted to analyse were 
included. The two additional characteristics: “marital status” and “living with children under 
15 years old” were received by separate SPSS-files 07.03.2007. They were transformed and 
imported as described above and “-koblet” was appended to the filename to separate them 
from the earlier files.   
 
III.1 Data manipulation and analyses 
In order to make it possible to analyse the WTP for a respondent on the different life 
extensions and his/her linearity, additional STATA do-files were created. The first was called 
"PriceWeek1Year" and recalculated the price the respondent had given to the different life 
extension offers in questions a), b) and c), to price per week. This file was run on 
questionnaires 1 and 2, which both have a one-year perspective. A corresponding file, called 
"PriceWeek10Years" was made for questionnaire 3 and 4, which have a 10-year perspective. 
The respondents who had responded by one of the prices in the payment card were calculated 
first, followed by calculations for the ones who had set their own price. 
 
All data manipulation and transformation is done by a common STATA do-file called 
"MakeAll". This has been updated several times and all analyses rerun for each update. New 
variables called “skjema” 1, 2, 3 and 4 were created from g1, 2, 3 og 4. “Skjema” was later 
renamed “questionnaire”. New data-files were created which contained the answers to 
questions a, b and c respectively. They were saved as galla, gallb and gallc. New variables 
were created to match the separate data-files, called “accepted” (yes/no answers), “WTP” 
(maximum WTP), “sure” (level of certainty in the respondents answer), “whynot” 
(explanation of a negative answer). New variables for the 2 perspectives; 1 and 10 years were 
created, called “perspective” and for the different life extensions (“extension”). In order to be 
able to make a logistic regression and other additional analyses on the data, the dataset where 
changed from parallell to a sequential layout. The three datasets galla, gallb and gallc were 
appended and the resulting file was named “gcombined”. Another variable, called w4kr, was 
created. It divided the respondents into four new groups, coded L, I, D and U. L=linear, 
I=increasing, D=decreasing and U=uncertain. The category was determined by the 
respondents WTP. The respondent could be linear, increasing or decreasing in the maximum 
price per week they had given on the increasing life extension offers. Uncertain respondents 
had a deviant price in the middle, on question b), but were linear in questions a) and c). 
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 III.2 Description of the variables in STATA 
Contains data from gall.dta 
  obs:         2,402                           
 vars:            71                          16 Oct 2007 20:30 
 size:     2,985,686 (85.8% of memory free) 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
              storage  display     value 
variable name   type   format      label      variable label 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
respid          int    %10.0g                  
id              str7   %9s                    id 
intrep          byte   %10.0g      intrep     Intrep 
kjonnx          str1   %9s                  * Kjønn 
age             byte   %10.0g                 Age 
fylke05         byte   %16.0g      fylke05    County 
education       byte   %60.0g      education  Highest completed education 
persinnt        byte   %24.0g      persinnt   Yearly personal income before taxes in NOK 
houshold_inc    byte   %28.0g      houshold_inc Yearly houshold income before taxes in NOK 
livsopph        byte   %35.0g      livsopph   What is your main income source? 
antpers0        byte   %20.0g      antpers    How many persons live normally in this household, 
            when counting all adults and children 
kjonn           byte   %10.0g      kjonn      Sex 
stdalder        byte   %10.0g      stdalder    
xalder          byte   %10.0g      xalder      
stdgeo          byte   %17.0g      stdgeo      
grgeo           byte   %13.0g      grgeo       
intern          byte   %10.0g      intern      
q38             byte   %10.0g      q38        1 year left to live. 1 additional week for 2 500 
            NOK. 
q39             byte   %51.0g      q39        How much would you pay as a maximum for this  
            treatment? 
q39_o           str85  %85s                   How much would you pay as a maximum for this  
            treatment? 
q40             byte   %17.0g      q40        How sure are you on your answers? 
q41             byte   %56.0g      q41        If you answered you did not want treatment A or  
            did not want to pay anything for 
q41_o           str200 %200s                  If you answered you did not want treatment A or 
            did not want to pay anything for 
q42             byte   %10.0g      q42        1 year left to live. 4 additional weeks for  
            10 000 NOK. 
q43             byte   %51.0g      q43        How much would you pay as a maximum for this  
            treatment? 
q43_o           str60  %60s                   How much would you pay as a maximum for this  
            treatment? 
q44             byte   %17.0g      q44        How sure are you on your answers? 
q51             byte   %56.0g      q51        If you answered you did not want treatment B or 
            did not want to pay anything for 
q51_o           str200 %200s                  If you answered you did not want treatment B or 
            did not want to pay anything for 
q46             byte   %10.0g      q46        1 year left to live. 4 additional months for  
            40 000 NOK 
q47             byte   %51.0g      q47        How much would you pay as a maximum for this  
            treatment? 
q47_o           str171 %171s                  How much would you pay as a maximum for this  
            treatment? 
q48             byte   %17.0g      q48        How sure are you on your answers? 
q49             byte   %56.0g      q49        If you answered you did not want treatment C or 
            did not want to pay anything for 
q49_o           str200 %200s                  If you answered you did not want treatment C or 
            did not want to pay anything for 
q50             byte   %23.0g      q50        How do you find your own health? 
kommenta        str200 %200s                  Comments or views on the questionnaire? 
q41_k           byte   %25.0g      reason_not_accepted 
q51_k           byte   %25.0g      reason_not_accepted 
q49_k           byte   %25.0g      reason_not_accepted 
q38_k           byte   %9.0g                   
q42_k           byte   %9.0g                   
q46_k           byte   %9.0g                   
q39_k           byte   %9.0g                   
q43_k           byte   %9.0g                   
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q47_k           byte   %9.0g                   
q39_kr          float  %9.0g                   
q43_kr          float  %9.0g                   
q47_kr          float  %9.0g                   
w4kr            str1   %9s                     
under15y        byte   %18.0g      under15y   Persons in the household under 15 years old 
sivil           byte   %10.0g                 Hva er din sivil status? 
_merge          byte   %8.0g                   
questionnaire   byte   %15.0g      questionnaire 
livsforlengelse byte   %9.0g                   
perspective     str8   %9s                     
qA_status       byte   %18.0g      status      
qB_status       byte   %18.0g      status      
qC_status       byte   %18.0g      status      
sex_r           float  %9.0g       sex_r       
childrenunder15 float  %9.0g       childrenunder15 
maritalstatus   float  %9.0g       maritalstatus 
ja_a            float  %9.0g                   
ja_b            float  %9.0g                   
ja_c            float  %9.0g                   
spma            float  %9.0g       offer       
spmb            float  %9.0g       offer       
spmc            float  %9.0g       offer       
remove          float  %9.0g                   
WTP_avg         float  %9.0g                  Average WTP per week calculated from q39_kr,  
            q43_kr and q47_kr 
WTP_se          float  %9.0g                  WTP per week Standard error from the linearity  
            of q39_kr, q43_kr and q47_kr  
                                            * indicated variables have notes 
Table 5 Gall.dta described 
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Contains data from gcombined.dta 
  obs:         7,206                           
 vars:           104                          16 Oct 2007 20:30 
 size:    11,680,926 (44.3% of memory free) 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
              storage  display     value 
variable name   type   format      label      variable label 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
respid          int    %10.0g                  
id              str7   %9s                    id 
intrep          byte   %10.0g      intrep     Intrep 
kjonnx          str1   %9s                  * Kjønn 
age             byte   %10.0g                 Age 
fylke05         byte   %16.0g      fylke05    County 
education       byte   %60.0g      education 
                                              Highest completed education 
persinnt        byte   %24.0g      persinnt   Yearly personal income before 
                                                taxes in NOK 
houshold_inc    byte   %28.0g      houshold_inc 
                                              Yearly houshold income before 
                                                taxes in NOK 
livsopph        byte   %35.0g      livsopph   What is your main income source? 
antpers0        byte   %20.0g      antpers    How many persons live normally 
                                                in this household, when 
                                                counting all adults and c 
kjonn           byte   %10.0g      kjonn      Sex 
stdalder        byte   %10.0g      stdalder    
xalder          byte   %10.0g      xalder      
stdgeo          byte   %17.0g      stdgeo      
grgeo           byte   %13.0g      grgeo       
intern          byte   %10.0g      intern      
q38             byte   %10.0g      q38        1 year left to live. 1 
                                                additional week for 2 500 NOK. 
q39             byte   %51.0g      q39        How much would you pay as a 
                                                maximum for this treatment? 
q39_o           str85  %85s                   How much would you pay as a 
                                                maximum for this treatment? 
q40             byte   %17.0g      q40        How sure are you on your answers? 
q41             byte   %56.0g      q41        If you answered you did not want treatment A or  
            did not want to pay anything for 
q41_o           str200 %200s                  If you answered you did not want treatment A or  
            did not want to pay anything for 
q42             byte   %10.0g      q42        1 year left to live. 4 additional weeks for  
            10 000 NOK. 
q43             byte   %51.0g      q43        How much would you pay as a 
                                                maximum for this treatment? 
q43_o           str60  %60s                   How much would you pay as a 
                                                maximum for this treatment? 
q44             byte   %17.0g      q44        How sure are you on your 
                                                answers? 
q51             byte   %56.0g      q51        If you answered you did not want treatment B or  
            did not want to pay anything for 
q51_o           str200 %200s                  If you answered you did not want treatment B or 
            did not want to pay anything for 
q46             byte   %10.0g      q46        1 year left to live. 4 additional months for 
            40 000 NOK 
q47             byte   %51.0g      q47        How much would you pay as a maximum for this  
                                              treatment? 
q47_o           str171 %171s                  How much would you pay as a maximum for this  
            treatment? 
q48             byte   %17.0g      q48        How sure are you on your answers? 
q49             byte   %56.0g      q49        If you answered you did not want treatment C or  
            did not want to pay anything for 
q49_o           str200 %200s                  If you answered you did not want treatment C or  
            did not want to pay anything for 
q50             byte   %23.0g      q50        How do you find your own health? 
kommenta        str200 %200s                  Comments or views on the questionnaire? 
q41_k           byte   %25.0g      reason_not_accepted 
                                               
q51_k           byte   %25.0g      reason_not_accepted 
                                               
q49_k           byte   %25.0g      reason_not_accepted 
                                               
q38_k           byte   %9.0g                   
q42_k           byte   %9.0g                   
q46_k           byte   %9.0g                   
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q39_k           byte   %9.0g                   
q43_k           byte   %9.0g                   
q47_k           byte   %9.0g                   
q39_kr          float  %9.0g                   
q43_kr          float  %9.0g                   
q47_kr          float  %9.0g                   
under15y        byte   %18.0g      under15y   Persons in the household under 15 years old 
sivil           byte   %10.0g                 Hva er din sivil status? 
_merge          byte   %8.0g                   
questionnaire   byte   %15.0g      questionnaire 
                                               
livsforlengelse byte   %9.0g                   
perspective     str8   %9s                     
qA_status       byte   %18.0g      status      
qB_status       byte   %18.0g      status      
qC_status       byte   %18.0g      status      
sex_r           byte   %9.0g       sex_r       
childrenunder15 byte   %9.0g       childrenunder15 
                                               
maritalstatus   byte   %9.0g       maritalstatus 
                                               
ja_a            byte   %9.0g                   
ja_b            byte   %9.0g                   
ja_c            byte   %9.0g                   
spma            byte   %9.0g       offer       
spmb            byte   %9.0g       offer       
spmc            byte   %9.0g       offer       
remove          byte   %9.0g                   
WTP_avg         float  %9.0g                  Average WTP per week calculated from q39_kr, 
            q43_kr and q47_kr 
WTP_se          float  %9.0g                  WTP per week Standard error from the linearity 
            of q39_kr, q43_kr and q47_kr 
accepted        byte   %9.0g                   
accepted_c      byte   %9.0g       accepted_C 
                                               
WTP             byte   %9.0g                   
WTP_c           byte   %9.0g                   
WTP_o           str171 %171s                   
WTP_week        float  %9.0g                   
sure            byte   %9.0g                   
whynot          byte   %9.0g                   
whynot_c        byte   %25.0g      reason_not_accepted 
                                               
whynot_o        str200 %200s                   
status          byte   %18.0g      status      
extension       byte   %9.0g                   
offer           byte   %9.0g       offer       
accepted_r      byte   %9.0g       accepted_r 
                                               
married_previ~m byte   %9.0g                   
maritalstatus~r byte   %9.0g                   
marita~nmarried byte   %9.0g                   
maritalstatus~m byte   %9.0g                   
marita~_married byte   %9.0g                   
education_upp~l byte   %9.0g                   
education_u~g4y byte   %9.0g                   
education_u~_4y byte   %9.0g                   
education_nin~s byte   %9.0g                   
children_1      byte   %9.0g                   
children_2      byte   %9.0g                   
children_3      byte   %9.0g                   
children_0      byte   %9.0g                   
atleast50       byte   %9.0g                   
age40           byte   %9.0g                   
age45           byte   %9.0g                   
age50           byte   %9.0g                   
age55           byte   %9.0g                   
w4kr            str1   %9s                     
WTP_week_capped float  %9.0g                   
Table 6 Gcombined described  
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IV REMOVAL OF INVALID ANSWERS 
The first adjustment concerned the respondents’ conviction to their answers. The respondents 
had first answered yes/no to an offer of life extension for a given price and then set their 
maximum WTP for the same life extension. Next, they had been asked to indicate how sure 
they were on their preceding answers, on a five-point scale. The answer to the question of the 
offer of life extension and the maximum WTP for the extension were removed if the 
respondent had answered  “very uncertain”. If they were not “very uncertain” on their answers 
to the other questions in the questionnaire they were not withdrawn from the other questions. 
The reason for this data correction was to remove uncertainty in the given answers. 
 
The next corrective concerned those respondents who had answered “no” to the life extension 
offer and did not want to pay anything for the treatment. They were asked to explain the 
reason for their given answers. If their reason was the treatment had no value, they could not 
afford it or they did not consider the benefit large enough they were included in the data set 
for the analysis. If they had given the answer they had difficulties in relating to the question, 
their answers were removed from the study concerning the preceding question. If they had 
difficulties, relating to an offer of 1 week it is not obvious that they would have difficulties in 
relating to an offer of 1 month or 4 months. The respondents were removed if they had given 
other explanations that were considered not valid for being included in the study. It could be 
respondents who had protested against the given conditions in the study and given answers 
like “I mean the state should pay for health care”. These respondents were considered not to 
have accepted or understood the preconditions in the study and were removed from the 
analyses for all of their given answers. The corrections are performed by the STATA do-file 
called “RemoveInvalidanswers” that was run on each of the four groups. 
 
The table below presents the answers given by the respondents who had answered that they 
did not want the life extension to the given price and did not want to pay anything for it. The 
different answers were categorised in 1) No value 2) Cannot afford 3) Benefit not large 
enough 4) Cannot relate to question 5) Other valid exp (included) 6) Other invalid (excluded).      
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Figure 3 Distribution of answers to the question of why the respondent did not want to pay anything for 
the offered treatment 
 
Offer No value 
Cannot 
afford 
Benefit not 
big enough 
Cannot 
relate 
Other 
(valid) 
Other 
(invalid) Total 
1 y 1 w 50 4 112 17 13 4 200
1 y 2 w 52 3 85 17 5 11 173
1 y 4 w 37 7 81 17 9 9 160
1 y 2 m 47 7 68 17 3 11 153
1 y 4 m 29 11 54 17 5 8 124
1 y 8 m 37 19 27 15 1 13 112
10 y 2 w 46 0 135 29 4 10 224
10 y 3 w 46 0 109 19 11 14 199
10 y 2 m 44 1 112 9 7 13 186
10 y 3 m 38 3 88 16 12 15 172
10 y 8 m 25 6 70 18 9 14 142
10 y 1 y 24 15 36 16 6 13 110
Total 475 76 977 207 85 135 1,955
Table 7 Number of respondents for each reason for declining to pay anything for the offered treatment 
 
Illogical responses were also withdrawn. The answers were classified illogical if a respondent 
had been willing to pay an amount of money for a short life extension but nothing at all for a 
longer life extension.  
 
A presentation of included and excluded respondents follows below. The table presents the 
answers from the original data set, included and excluded in the analysis. The excluded 
answers are divided in four categories, depending on the reason for the exclusion. The 
categories are: 1) Not understood 2) Not able to relate to question 3) Very uncertain and 4) 
Illogical. If a respondent is classified 1) or 4), his answers are not considered trustworthy and 
the respondent is removed from the dataset. If he is classified 2) or 3) the answers from the 
preceding question is removed. 
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Figure 4 Number of answers removed for each consistancy check 
 
offer Included 
Not 
understood
Not able to 
relate 
Very 
uncertain Illogical Total 
1 y 1 w 512 9 15 52 12 600 
1 y 2 w 497 18 13 55 17 600 
1 y 4 w 512 9 15 52 12 600 
1 y 2 m 496 18 14 55 17 600 
1 y 4 m 512 9 15 52 12 600 
1 y 8 m 499 18 11 55 17 600 
10 y 2 w 490 19 21 56 16 602 
10 y 3 w 490 22 16 55 17 600 
10 y 2 m 505 19 6 56 16 602 
10 y 3 m 495 22 11 55 17 600 
10 y 8 m 497 19 14 56 16 602 
10 y 1 y 495 22 11 55 17 600 
Total 6000 204 162 654 186 7206 
Table 8 Number of answers removed for each consistancy check 
 
The total number of answers for the four questionnaires is 7206. The number of removed 
answers is 1206 which leaves 6000 or 83.26 %, for the analysis. Very uncertain answers 
constitute the largest group of removed answers (654), 162 answers were removed due to 
difficulties in relating to the question and 204 answers (68 persons) were removed for not 
having understood and 186 answers (62 persons) due to illogical answers. 
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V STATISTICAL ANALYSES 
V.1 Level of acceptance for the different offers 
A binomial test was performed on the rate of acceptance for different offers of life extensions 
to test the hypothesis of linear valuation of different life extension offers. Since the price per 
week was the same for the different life extension offers in the same time perspective; 1- or 
10 years, the percentage acceptance would be the same in the same time perspective if 
respondents had a linear valuation. The mean percentage acceptance was used as the reference 
value, i.e. the basis for the expected value. The binomial test was chosen because it allows for 
tests of the proportion of successes on a two-level categorical dependent variable compared to 
a hypothesized value. The “yes” or “no” answers to the offers of life extensions match this 
description. The hypothesized value in this case is the mean value, calculated separately for 
the two perspectives. 
 
In the 1-year perspective, the lowest offer was 1 week and the acceptance rate was 44.3 %. 
The acceptance rate was increasing up to the highest offer of 8 months to 58.6 %, with one 
exception. The offer of 2 months had an acceptance rate of 56.8%, followed by the offer of 4 
months, which had 57.5%. The highest rise in acceptance level per week was found between 1 
and 2 weeks extension with a difference of 7 percentage points, from 44.3% to 51.3%. The 
offer of 1 week is the only offer given in the study with an acceptance level under 50%.  
 
In the 10-years perspective, the lowest offer was 2 weeks and the acceptance rate was 53.3%. 
The acceptance level increased with longer life extensions up to the highest offer. For the 
highest offer of increased lifetime; 1 year, the level of acceptance was 74.8%. As in the 1-year 
perspective, the highest rise in acceptance level per week was found between the lowest life 
increase levels but in the 10-years perspective, this was between 2 and 3 weeks. The 
percentage increase was 3.2%, from 53,3 to 56.5%. 
 
For the 1-year perspective, the mean rate of acceptance was 53.45 % and for the 10-years 
perspective, the mean rate of acceptance was 61.64 %. The mean acceptance rates were used 
in the calculation of the expected value in the binomial tests. In the 1-year perspective, the 
offer of 1 week had a significantly lower rate of acceptance compared to the mean value 
(P=0.000022). The offer of 8 months had a significantly higher rate of acceptance 
(P=0.012121). In the 10-years perspective, the offers of 2- and 3 weeks had significantly 
lower acceptance rates (P= 0.000097) and (P= 0.011762) respectively. The offer of 1 year had 
a significantly higher rate of acceptance (P= 0.000000). 
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V.1.1 Table and figure 
 
Figure 5 Acceptance rates for offers of life extensions in weeks one or ten years from today. Graphs by 
perspective 
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Figure 6 Percentage of respondents accepting the offer of life extension. One plot for each percpective and 
weeks of life extension on the horisontal axis 
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Offer Yes No Total Yes No 
1 y 1 w 227 285 512 44,3 % 55,7 % 
1 y 2 w 255 242 497 51,3 % 48,7 % 
1 y 4 w 267 242 509 52,5 % 47,5 % 
1 y 2 m 281 214 495 56,8 % 43,2 % 
1 y 4 m 293 217 510 57,5 % 42,5 % 
1 y 8 m 290 205 495 58,6 % 41,4 % 
1 y total 1,613 1,405 3,018 54,5 % 46,6 % 
 
10 y 2 w 261 229 490 53,3 % 46,7 % 
10 y 3 w 277 213 490 56,5 % 43,5 % 
10 y 2 m 310 207 517 60,0 % 40,0 % 
10 y 3 m 303 183 486 62,3 % 37,7 % 
10 y 8 m 319 186 505 63,2 % 36,8 % 
10 y 1 y 360 121 481 74,8 % 25,2 % 
10y total 1,830 1,139 2,969 61,6 % 38,4 % 
 
Total 3,443 2,544 5,987 57,5 % 42,5 % 
Table 9 Number and percentage of respondents accepting the offer of life extension for each perspective 
V.1.2 Acceptance rates, sorted by level of income 
     Yearly houshold income before taxes in NOK 
offer   under 
200  
200 000 
399 999  
400 000 
599 999 
600 000 
799 999 
800 000 
999 999 
1 000 000 
1 199 999 
1 200 000 
And more 
     Total 
1 y 1 w 60.0 % 41.9 %  36.1 %  49.0 % 44.7 % 60.0 %  57.1 %  44.3 % 
 10 93 147 145 76 20 21  512 
1 y 2 w  45.5 %  46,9 % 41.5 % 53.7 % 63.0 % 62.5 % 70.6 %  51.3 % 
 11 81 142 149 81 16  17  497 
1 y 4 w  70.0 % 47.3 % 46.9 % 55.8 % 52.5 % 65.0 %  71.4 %  52.5 % 
 10 91 147 147 73        20         21         509 
1 y 2 m  45.5 % 48.1 % 49.3 % 61.6 % 66.2 % 62.5 %  76.5 %  56.8 % 
 11  81 142 151 77 16  17  495 
1 y 4 m  50.0 %  51.1 %  48.6 %  62.3 % 63.6 % 65.0 % 85.7 %  57.5 % 
 10  92 144  146 77 20  21  510 
1 y 8 m  36.4 %  35.8 %  56.2 %  65.3 % 70.1 % 62.5 % 87.5 % 58.6 % 
 11 81 144 150 77        16         16  495 
Total  50.8 % 45.3 % 46.4 % 58.0 % 60.1 % 63.0 %  74.3%  53.4% 
 63 519 866 888 461 108  113 3018 
Table 10 Number of respondents and percentage of respondents accepting the offer of life extension for 
different levels of yearly household income before taxes for 1 year left to live 
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     Yearly houshold income before taxes in NOK 
offer   under 
200  
200 000 
399 999  
400 000 
599 999 
600 000 
799 999 
800 000 
999 999 
1 000 000 
1 199 999 
1 200 000 
And more 
     Total 
10 y 2 w 31,2 % 55,2 % 50,6 % 50,9 % 64,4 % 66,6 % 62,5 % 53,2 % 
 16 67 156 163 59 21 8 490 
10 y 3 w  37,5 % 46,8 % 54,5 % 62,3 % 62,0 % 56,5 % 61,5 % 56,5 % 
    8 94 132 162 58 23 13 490 
10 y 2 m  50,0 % 61,9 % 55,4 % 57,6 % 74,1 % 73,9 % 55,5 % 59,9 % 
          16 71 166 170 62 23 9 517 
10 y 3 m  50,0 % 53,1 % 56,1 % 69,3 % 70,1 % 63,6 % 75,0 % 62,3 % 
     8 94 130 163 57 22 12 486 
10 y 8 m  37,5 % 60,8 % 56,4 % 65,0 % 77,9 % 90,0 % 55,5 % 63,1 % 
     16 69 163 169 59 20 9 505 
10 y 1 y  62,5 % 56,3 % 71,2 % 81,8 % 85,7 % 91,3 % 86,6 % 74,8 % 
       8 94 125 160 56 23 15 481 
Total  43,0 % 55,2 % 56,9 % 64,4 % 72,3 % 73,4 % 68,1 % 61,6 % 
 72 489 872 987 351 132 66 2969 
Table 11 Number of respondents and percentage of respondents accepting the offer of life extension for 
different levels of yearly household income before taxes for 10 years left to live 
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V.1.3 Binomial tests of acceptance rates 
. by offer, sort : bitest accepted_r =0,53446 if perspective=="1 year" 
 
-> offer = 1 y 1 w 
    Variable |        N   Observed k   Expected k   Assumed p   Observed p 
-------------+------------------------------------------------------------ 
  accepted_r |      512        227     273.6435       0.53446      0.44336 
 
  Pr(k >= 227)             = 0.999985  (one-sided test) 
  Pr(k <= 227)             = 0.000022  (one-sided test) 
  Pr(k <= 227 or k >= 320) = 0.000044  (two-sided test) 
 
-> offer = 1 y 2 w 
    Variable |        N   Observed k   Expected k   Assumed p   Observed p 
-------------+------------------------------------------------------------ 
  accepted_r |      497        255     265.6266       0.53446      0.51308 
 
  Pr(k >= 255)             = 0.841482  (one-sided test) 
  Pr(k <= 255)             = 0.181202  (one-sided test) 
  Pr(k <= 255 or k >= 277) = 0.345300  (two-sided test) 
 
-> offer = 1 y 4 w 
    Variable |        N   Observed k   Expected k   Assumed p   Observed p 
-------------+------------------------------------------------------------ 
  accepted_r |      509        267     272.0401       0.53446      0.52456 
 
  Pr(k >= 267)             = 0.688995  (one-sided test) 
  Pr(k <= 267)             = 0.343022  (one-sided test) 
  Pr(k <= 267 or k >= 278) = 0.657100  (two-sided test) 
 
-> offer = 1 y 2 m 
 
    Variable |        N   Observed k   Expected k   Assumed p   Observed p 
-------------+------------------------------------------------------------ 
  accepted_r |      495        281     264.5576       0.53446      0.56768 
 
  Pr(k >= 281)             = 0.075232  (one-sided test) 
  Pr(k <= 281)             = 0.936789  (one-sided test) 
  Pr(k <= 248 or k >= 281) = 0.149313  (two-sided test) 
 
-> offer = 1 y 4 m 
    Variable |        N   Observed k   Expected k   Assumed p   Observed p 
-------------+------------------------------------------------------------ 
  accepted_r |      510        293     272.5745       0.53446      0.57451 
 
  Pr(k >= 293)             = 0.038227  (one-sided test) 
  Pr(k <= 293)             = 0.968619  (one-sided test) 
  Pr(k <= 252 or k >= 293) = 0.075725  (two-sided test) 
 
-> offer = 1 y 8 m 
    Variable |        N   Observed k   Expected k   Assumed p   Observed p 
-------------+------------------------------------------------------------ 
  accepted_r |      495        290     264.5576       0.53446      0.58586 
 
  Pr(k >= 290)             = 0.012121  (one-sided test) 
  Pr(k <= 290)             = 0.990462  (one-sided test) 
  Pr(k <= 239 or k >= 290) = 0.024181  (two-sided test) 
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. by offer, sort : bitest accepted_r =0.61637 if perspective=="10 years" 
 
-> offer = 10 y 2 w 
    Variable |        N   Observed k   Expected k   Assumed p   Observed p 
-------------+------------------------------------------------------------ 
  accepted_r |      490        261     302.0209       0.61637      0.53265 
 
  Pr(k >= 261)             = 0.999933  (one-sided test) 
  Pr(k <= 261)             = 0.000097  (one-sided test) 
  Pr(k <= 261 or k >= 343) = 0.000164  (two-sided test) 
 
-> offer = 10 y 3 w 
    Variable |        N   Observed k   Expected k   Assumed p   Observed p 
-------------+------------------------------------------------------------ 
  accepted_r |      490        277     302.0209       0.61637      0.56531 
 
  Pr(k >= 277)             = 0.990775  (one-sided test) 
  Pr(k <= 277)             = 0.011762  (one-sided test) 
  Pr(k <= 277 or k >= 327) = 0.022736  (two-sided test) 
 
-> offer = 10 y 2 m 
    Variable |        N   Observed k   Expected k   Assumed p   Observed p 
-------------+------------------------------------------------------------ 
  accepted_r |      517        310     318.6628       0.61637      0.59961 
 
  Pr(k >= 310)             = 0.796670  (one-sided test) 
  Pr(k <= 310)             = 0.229703  (one-sided test) 
  Pr(k <= 310 or k >= 328) = 0.442152  (two-sided test) 
 
-> offer = 10 y 3 m 
    Variable |        N   Observed k   Expected k   Assumed p   Observed p 
-------------+------------------------------------------------------------ 
  accepted_r |      486        303     299.5554       0.61637      0.62346 
 
  Pr(k >= 303)             = 0.393085  (one-sided test) 
  Pr(k <= 303)             = 0.642361  (one-sided test) 
  Pr(k <= 296 or k >= 303) = 0.779644  (two-sided test) 
 
-> offer = 10 y 8 m 
    Variable |        N   Observed k   Expected k   Assumed p   Observed p 
-------------+------------------------------------------------------------ 
  accepted_r |      505        319     311.2664       0.61637      0.63168 
 
  Pr(k >= 319)             = 0.254659  (one-sided test) 
  Pr(k <= 319)             = 0.773939  (one-sided test) 
  Pr(k <= 303 or k >= 319) = 0.492761  (two-sided test) 
 
-> offer = 10 y 1 y 
    Variable |        N   Observed k   Expected k   Assumed p   Observed p 
-------------+------------------------------------------------------------ 
  accepted_r |      481        360     296.4736       0.61637      0.74844 
 
  Pr(k >= 360)             = 0.000000  (one-sided test) 
  Pr(k <= 360)             = 1.000000  (one-sided test) 
  Pr(k <= 230 or k >= 360) = 0.000000  (two-sided test) 
V.2 The logistic regression model 
Logistic regression was chosen because “accepted_r” is a dichotomous variable, coded 1 for 
yes and 0 for no. In STATA’s help manual, logistic regression is recommended for binary 
outcome data. The basic model is maximum-likelihood logistic regression, reporting odds 
ratios.  
 
Since each respondent was asked to answer yes/no to three offers of life extension there is a 
risk of bias in the data if the answers were treated as independent answers. Therefore, the 
answers from each respondent are treated together by a command named: “robust cluster”. 
Robust cluster adjusts standard errors for intragroup correlation. This does not change the 
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level of correlation between variables but increases the standard error term and thereby also 
the P-value.  
V.2.1 Correlations among background variables 
The strongest correlations were found, in decreasing order, between age40 and not having any 
children (negative correlation -0.4200), age55 and not having any children (positive 
correlation 0.3792) age40 and having 2 children (positive correlation 0.3003), household 
income and maritalstatus_earlierm (negative correlation -0.2855), university over 4 years and 
household income (positive correlation 0.2671), household income and maritalstatus_married 
(positive correlation 0.2638). These correlations were not considered large enough for a 
multicolinearity problem to occur. 
 
. corr age40 age45 age50 age55 sex_r education_nine_years education_upper_secondary_school 
education_university_including4y education_university_over_4y houshold_inc 
maritalstatus_married maritalstatus_partner maritalstatus_unmarried maritalstatus_earlierm 
children_0 children_1 children_2 children_3 extension, mean 
(obs=6276) 
 
    Variable |         Mean    Std. Dev.          Min          Max 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------- 
       age40 |     .2605163     .4389513            0            1 
       age45 |     .2734226     .4457514            0            1 
       age50 |     .2600382     .4386901            0            1 
       age55 |     .2060229     .4044794            0            1 
       sex_r |     .5076482     .4999813            0            1 
education_~s |     .0669216     .2499061            0            1 
education_~l |     .4072658     .4913643            0            1 
educatio~g4y |     .3059273     .4608358            0            1 
educatio~_4y |     .2198853     .4142017            0            1 
houshold_inc |     3.789675     1.191495            1            7 
mar~_married |     .7385277     .4394716            0            1 
maritalsta~r |     .1524857     .3595196            0            1 
mar~nmarried |     .0310707     .1735228            0            1 
maritalsta~m |     .0779159     .2680605            0            1 
  children_0 |     .5310707     .4990734            0            1 
  children_1 |     .2313576      .421734            0            1 
  children_2 |     .1696941     .3753937            0            1 
  children_3 |     .0678776     .2515558            0            1 
   extension |     13.97658     14.58906            1           48 
 
 
 
 
             |    age40    age45    age50    age55    sex_r educat~s educat~l educ~g4y educ~_4y housho~c 
-------------+------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
       age40 |   1.0000 
       age45 |  -0.3641   1.0000 
       age50 |  -0.3519  -0.3637   1.0000 
       age55 |  -0.3023  -0.3125  -0.3020   1.0000 
       sex_r |  -0.0341  -0.0759   0.0411   0.0761   1.0000 
education_~s |  -0.0500   0.0117   0.0462  -0.0087  -0.0079   1.0000 
education_~l |   0.0666   0.0045  -0.0145  -0.0614  -0.0224  -0.2220   1.0000 
educatio~g4y |   0.0314   0.0117  -0.0270  -0.0176   0.0313  -0.1778  -0.5503   1.0000 
educatio~_4y |  -0.0837  -0.0253   0.0194   0.0977  -0.0035  -0.1422  -0.4401  -0.3525   1.0000 
houshold_inc |  -0.0616  -0.0177   0.0297   0.0542   0.0878  -0.1117  -0.2424   0.0789   0.2671   1.0000 
mar~_married |  -0.1103  -0.0328   0.0229   0.1310   0.0733  -0.0148  -0.0094  -0.0157   0.0375   0.2638 
maritalsta~r |   0.1118   0.0023  -0.0302  -0.0911  -0.0052   0.0514   0.0246  -0.0075  -0.0518  -0.0044 
mar~nmarried |   0.0506   0.0632  -0.0434  -0.0776  -0.0716  -0.0369   0.0198  -0.0232   0.0247  -0.2181 
maritalsta~m |  -0.0019   0.0097   0.0310  -0.0422  -0.0669  -0.0208  -0.0304   0.0508  -0.0079  -0.2855 
  children_0 |  -0.4200  -0.1306   0.2033   0.3792  -0.0651   0.0715  -0.0087  -0.0372   0.0086   0.0520 
  children_1 |   0.0798   0.1187  -0.0255  -0.1898   0.0097  -0.0335   0.0090   0.0269  -0.0203  -0.0582 
  children_2 |   0.3003   0.0341  -0.1461  -0.2051   0.0657  -0.0242  -0.0145   0.0508  -0.0248   0.0071 
  children_3 |   0.2512   0.0093  -0.1426  -0.1281   0.0149  -0.0495   0.0239  -0.0472   0.0540  -0.0162 
   extension |  -0.0027   0.0010   0.0020  -0.0003  -0.0016   0.0105  -0.0033  -0.0059   0.0042   0.0003 
 
 
 
             | marita.. marita~r m~unma~d marita~m childr~0 childr~1 childr~2 childr~3 extens~n 
-------------+--------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
mar~_married |   1.0000 
maritalsta~r |  -0.7129   1.0000 
mar~nmarried |  -0.3010  -0.0760   1.0000 
maritalsta~m |  -0.4885  -0.1233  -0.0521   1.0000 
  children_0 |   0.0883  -0.0331  -0.0470  -0.0699   1.0000 
  children_1 |  -0.0656  -0.0183   0.0716   0.0858  -0.5839   1.0000 
  children_2 |  -0.0324   0.0314  -0.0076   0.0159  -0.4811  -0.2480   1.0000 
  children_3 |  -0.0167   0.0494  -0.0155  -0.0288  -0.2872  -0.1480  -0.1220   1.0000 
   extension |  -0.0025   0.0026  -0.0103   0.0073  -0.0098   0.0161  -0.0048  -0.0005   1.0000 
 
 
 
An alternative model is also examined with age from 40 to 59 years old in one variable and living with children under 15 years as a dichotomous 
variable (yes or no). In the alternative model the strongest correlations were found, in decreasing order, between age and living with children 
under 15 years old (negative correlation -0.5603), household income and maritalstatus_earlierm (negative correlation -0.2855), university over 4 
years and household income (positive correlation 0.2671), household income and maritalstatus_married (positive correlation 0.2638). These 
correlations were not considered large enough for a multicolinearity problem to occur. 
 
 
 
 75 
 76 
. corr age sex_r education_nine_years education_upper_secondary_school education_university_including4y education_university_over_4y houshold_inc 
maritalstatus_married maritalstatus_partner maritalstatus_unmarried maritalstatus_earlierm childrenunder15 extension, mean 
(obs=6276) 
 
 
    Variable |         Mean    Std. Dev.          Min          Max 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------- 
         age |     48.98327     5.612184           40           59 
       sex_r |     .5076482     .4999813            0            1 
education_~s |     .0669216     .2499061            0            1 
education_~l |     .4072658     .4913643            0            1 
educatio~g4y |     .3059273     .4608358            0            1 
educatio~_4y |     .2198853     .4142017            0            1 
houshold_inc |     3.789675     1.191495            1            7 
mar~_married |     .7385277     .4394716            0            1 
maritalsta~r |     .1524857     .3595196            0            1 
mar~nmarried |     .0310707     .1735228            0            1 
maritalsta~m |     .0779159     .2680605            0            1 
childrenu~15 |     .4689293     .4990734            0            1 
   extension |     13.97658     14.58906            1           48 
 
 
 
 
 
 
             |      age    sex_r educat~s educat~l educ~g4y educ~_4y housho~c marita.. marita~r m~unma~d marita~m child~15 extens~n 
-------------+--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
         age |   1.0000 
       sex_r |   0.0944   1.0000 
education_~s |   0.0277  -0.0079   1.0000 
education_~l |  -0.0801  -0.0224  -0.2220   1.0000 
educatio~g4y |  -0.0355   0.0313  -0.1778  -0.5503   1.0000 
educatio~_4y |   0.1178  -0.0035  -0.1422  -0.4401  -0.3525   1.0000 
houshold_inc |   0.0882   0.0878  -0.1117  -0.2424   0.0789   0.2671   1.0000 
mar~_married |   0.1572   0.0733  -0.0148  -0.0094  -0.0157   0.0375   0.2638   1.0000 
maritalsta~r |  -0.1352  -0.0052   0.0514   0.0246  -0.0075  -0.0518  -0.0044  -0.7129   1.0000 
mar~nmarried |  -0.0918  -0.0716  -0.0369   0.0198  -0.0232   0.0247  -0.2181  -0.3010  -0.0760   1.0000 
maritalsta~m |  -0.0169  -0.0669  -0.0208  -0.0304   0.0508  -0.0079  -0.2855  -0.4885  -0.1233  -0.0521   1.0000 
childrenu~15 |  -0.5603   0.0651  -0.0715   0.0087   0.0372  -0.0086  -0.0520  -0.0883   0.0331   0.0470   0.0699   1.0000 
   extension |   0.0010  -0.0016   0.0105  -0.0033  -0.0059   0.0042   0.0003  -0.0025   0.0026  -0.0103   0.0073   0.0098   1.0000 
 
 
 
 V.2.2 The separate background variables influences 
There is almost no difference in acceptance level between the age groups age40 and age45 
when age is analysed separately (odds ratio .993). For age50 the odds of accepting are lower 
(odds ratio .886) and for age55 the acceptance level is even lower, and on the borderline of 
becoming significant (odds ratio .808, P=0.056). If the respondents are divided in only two 
groups: under- and over 50 years old, the difference in acceptance level becomes significant. 
For the group “atleast50” the odds ratio is .853 for acceptance and the P-value is 0.041. 
The difference in acceptance level of the offer of life extension between the sexes is a bit 
smaller when sex is analysed separately than in the general model. When gender is analysed 
separately, men show a lower acceptance tendency than women with an odds ratio of .930 
(P=0.348). When gender is analysed in the model, the lower acceptance for men has an odds 
ratio of .844 and becomes significant (P=0.048).  
The lowest level of education: nine-year compulsory school is used as reference. The odds 
ratio for accepting when the respondent has completed upper secondary school, compared to a 
respondent with the highest level of education being nine-year compulsory school, is 1.33 
(P=0.085) which is a non-significant difference. For the variable: 
education_university_including4y (university up to and including 4 years) there is a 
significant difference in acceptance level compared to respondents with nine-year compulsory 
school. The odds ratio is 1.50 (P=0.017) which implies that the respondent who has spent up 
to 4 years at a university is more likely to accept the offer of life extension to the given price. 
Finally, for education_university_over_4y (university over 4 years) the level of acceptance is 
the same as in the group with up to 4 years of university compared to the nine-year 
compulsory school group. The odds ratio is 1.52 (P=0.017).  
For household income the level of acceptance is significantly higher with increasing income 
levels both when the variable is analysed separately and in the model. The odds for accepting 
with an increase in income level is 1.25 (P=0.000) when the variable is analysed separately. 
Marital status: married, is used as reference. First, maritalstatus_partner (living with a co-
habitee) is examined. The odds ratio for accepting when the respondent is living with a 
partner in comparison to a married respondent is .765 (P=0.020). The married respondent is 
significantly more likely to accept the offer than the respondent who is living in a partnership. 
The odds ratio for accepting when the respondent is unmarried is .851 (P= 0.231). In this case, 
the difference between being married and being unmarried is not significant. The odds ratio 
for accepting when the respondent has previously been married (widow/widower or divorced), 
in comparison to a married respondent is .985 (P=0.900). The married and the previously 
married respondents are very similar in their level of acceptance of the life extension-offer 
when marital status is analysed separately.  
Not living with children is used as reference. The odds ratio for accepting when a respondent 
is living with 1 child under 15 years old is 1.18 (P=0.127) which implies that there is a 
tendency for higher acceptance among respondents living with 1 child compared to those 
living without children. Living with 2 children under 15 years old has an odds ratio for 
accepting of 1.03 (P=0.812). In this case, there is just a small difference in acceptance rates 
between the groups living with 2 children compared to those living without children. Finally, 
for respondents living with 3 or more children the odds ratio is .899 (P=0.511). This result is 
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slightly surprising as it implies a tendency for a lower acceptance rate among respondents 
living with 3 or more children compared to those living without children. The difference is 
going in the opposite direction to the previously seen trends among respondents living with 
children. However, the difference is not significant.  
. logistic   accepted_r  age45 age50 age55, robust cluster (respid) 
Logistic regression                               Number of obs   =       5987 
                                                  Wald chi2(3)    =       4.43 
                                                  Prob > chi2     =     0.2182 
Log pseudolikelihood = -4077.3224                 Pseudo R2       =     0.0012 
 
                              (Std. Err. adjusted for 2092 clusters in respid) 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
             |               Robust 
  accepted_r | Odds Ratio   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
       age45 |   .9921903   .1069824    -0.07   0.942     .8031831    1.225675 
       age50 |   .8995132   .0990135    -0.96   0.336     .7249564      1.1161 
       age55 |   .8134353   .0918367    -1.83   0.067     .6519625    1.014901 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
 
 
. logistic   accepted_r  age45 age50 age55, robust cluster (respid) coef 
Logistic regression                               Number of obs   =       5987 
                                                  Wald chi2(3)    =       4.43 
                                                  Prob > chi2     =     0.2182 
Log pseudolikelihood = -4077.3224                 Pseudo R2       =     0.0012 
 
                              (Std. Err. adjusted for 2092 clusters in respid) 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
             |               Robust 
  accepted_r |      Coef.   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
       age45 |  -.0078404   .1078245    -0.07   0.942    -.2191725    .2034918 
       age50 |  -.1059016   .1100745    -0.96   0.336    -.3216437    .1098405 
       age55 |  -.2064888   .1128998    -1.83   0.067    -.4277683    .0147906 
       _cons |   .3755652   .0770564     4.87   0.000     .2245375    .5265928 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
 
 
. logistic   accepted_r  atleast50, robust cluster (respid) 
Logistic regression                               Number of obs   =       5987 
                                                  Wald chi2(1)    =       3.50 
                                                  Prob > chi2     =     0.0612 
Log pseudolikelihood = -4078.1915                 Pseudo R2       =     0.0010 
 
                              (Std. Err. adjusted for 2092 clusters in respid) 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
             |               Robust 
  accepted_r | Odds Ratio   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
   atleast50 |   .8634114   .0677331    -1.87   0.061     .7403592    1.006916 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
 
 
. logistic   accepted_r  atleast50, robust cluster (respid) coef 
Logistic regression                               Number of obs   =       5987 
                                                  Wald chi2(1)    =       3.50 
                                                  Prob > chi2     =     0.0612 
Log pseudolikelihood = -4078.1915                 Pseudo R2       =     0.0010 
 
                              (Std. Err. adjusted for 2092 clusters in respid) 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
             |               Robust 
  accepted_r |      Coef.   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
   atleast50 |   -.146864   .0784483    -1.87   0.061    -.3006198    .0068919 
       _cons |   .3716165   .0539052     6.89   0.000     .2659643    .4772687 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Table 12 Logistic regressions on age 
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           |         sex_r 
accepted_r |     woman        man |     Total 
-----------+----------------------+---------- 
        No |     1,243      1,301 |     2,544  
           |     41.70%     43.28%|     42.49%  
-----------+----------------------+---------- 
       Yes |     1,738      1,705 |     3,443  
           |     58.30%     56.72%|     57.51%  
-----------+----------------------+---------- 
     Total |     2,981      3,006 |     5,987  
           |    100.00%    100.00%|    100.00%  
Table 13 Percentage of respondents answering yes to the offer split by sex 
 
 
 
 
 
. logistic   accepted_r  sex_r, robust cluster (respid) 
Logistic regression                               Number of obs   =       5987 
                                                  Wald chi2(1)    =       0.69 
                                                  Prob > chi2     =     0.4079 
Log pseudolikelihood = -4081.3527                 Pseudo R2       =     0.0002 
 
                              (Std. Err. adjusted for 2092 clusters in respid) 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
             |               Robust 
  accepted_r | Odds Ratio   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
       sex_r |    .937278   .0733536    -0.83   0.408     .8039913    1.092661 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
 
 
. logistic   accepted_r  sex_r, robust cluster (respid) coef 
Logistic regression                               Number of obs   =       5987 
                                                  Wald chi2(1)    =       0.69 
                                                  Prob > chi2     =     0.4079 
Log pseudolikelihood = -4081.3527                 Pseudo R2       =     0.0002 
 
                              (Std. Err. adjusted for 2092 clusters in respid) 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
             |               Robust 
  accepted_r |      Coef.   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
       sex_r |  -.0647753   .0782624    -0.83   0.408    -.2181668    .0886162 
       _cons |   .3352072   .0544683     6.15   0.000     .2284512    .4419632 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Table 14 Logistic regression on sex 
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           |         Highest completed education 
accepted_r | nine-year  upper sec  universit  universit |     Total 
-----------+--------------------------------------------+---------- 
        No |       195      1,067        746        536 |     2,544  
           |     51.05%     43.78%     40.39%     40.58%|     42.49% 
-----------+--------------------------------------------+---------- 
       Yes |       187      1,370      1,101        785 |     3,443  
           |     48.95%     56.22%     59.61%     59.42%|     57.51%  
-----------+--------------------------------------------+---------- 
     Total |       382      2,437      1,847      1,321 |     5,987  
           |    100.00%    100.00%    100.00%    100.00%|    100.00% 
Table 15 Percentage of respondets answering yes to the offer split by education 
 
education_university_over_4y, robust cluster (respid) 
Logistic regression                               Number of obs   =       5987 
                                                  Wald chi2(3)    =       8.02 
                                                  Prob > chi2     =     0.0456 
Log pseudolikelihood = -4072.9653                 Pseudo R2       =     0.0022 
 
                              (Std. Err. adjusted for 2092 clusters in respid) 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
             |               Robust 
  accepted_r | Odds Ratio   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
education_~l |   1.338903   .2243379     1.74   0.082     .9641117    1.859392 
educatio~g4y |    1.53901   .2635208     2.52   0.012     1.100253    2.152735 
educatio~_4y |   1.527207   .2697923     2.40   0.017     1.080256    2.159081 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
 
 
. logistic   accepted_r  education_upper_secondary_school education_university_including4y 
education_university_over_4y, robust cluster (respid) coef 
Logistic regression                               Number of obs   =       5987 
                                                  Wald chi2(3)    =       8.02 
                                                  Prob > chi2     =     0.0456 
Log pseudolikelihood = -4072.9653                 Pseudo R2       =     0.0022 
 
                              (Std. Err. adjusted for 2092 clusters in respid) 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
             |               Robust 
  accepted_r |      Coef.   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
education_~l |   .2918507   .1675535     1.74   0.082    -.0365481    .6202496 
educatio~g4y |   .4311395   .1712274     2.52   0.012     .0955399    .7667391 
educatio~_4y |   .4234405   .1766573     2.40   0.017     .0771985    .7696825 
       _cons |  -.0418909    .155917    -0.27   0.788    -.3474827    .2637008 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Table 16 Logistic regression on eductation 
 
 
 
           |                  Yearly household income before taxes in NOK 
accepted_r | under 200  200 000 t  400 000 t  600 000 t  800 000 t  1 000 000  1 200 000 |     Total 
-----------+-----------------------------------------------------------------------------+---------- 
        No |        72        503        839        724        281         75         50 |     2,544  
           |     53.33%     49.90%     48.27%     38.61%     34.61%     31.25%     27.93%|     42.49%  
-----------+-----------------------------------------------------------------------------+---------- 
       Yes |        63        505        899      1,151        531        165        129 |     3,443  
           |     46.67%     50.10%     51.73%     61.39%     65.39%     68.75%     72.07%|     57.51%  
-----------+-----------------------------------------------------------------------------+---------- 
     Total |       135      1,008      1,738      1,875        812        240        179 |     5,987  
           |    100.00%    100.00%    100.00%    100.00%    100.00%    100.00%    100.00%|    100.00% 
 
Table 17 Percentage of respondents answering yes to the offer split by household income 
 
 
. logistic   accepted_r  houshold_inc, robust cluster (respid) 
Logistic regression                               Number of obs   =       5987 
                                                  Wald chi2(1)    =      45.13 
                                                  Prob > chi2     =     0.0000 
Log pseudolikelihood = -4029.3933                 Pseudo R2       =     0.0129 
 
                              (Std. Err. adjusted for 2092 clusters in respid) 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
             |               Robust 
  accepted_r | Odds Ratio   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
houshold_inc |   1.243523   .0403451     6.72   0.000      1.16691    1.325167 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
 
 
. logistic   accepted_r  houshold_inc, robust cluster (respid) coef 
Logistic regression                               Number of obs   =       5987 
                                                  Wald chi2(1)    =      45.13 
                                                  Prob > chi2     =     0.0000 
Log pseudolikelihood = -4029.3933                 Pseudo R2       =     0.0129 
 
                              (Std. Err. adjusted for 2092 clusters in respid) 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
             |               Robust 
  accepted_r |      Coef.   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
houshold_inc |   .2179488   .0324441     6.72   0.000     .1543594    .2815382 
       _cons |  -.4781347   .1220363    -3.92   0.000    -.7173215    -.238948 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Table 18 Logistic regression on household income
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           |                maritalstatus 
accepted_r |   married    partner  unmarried   earlierm |     Total 
-----------+--------------------------------------------+---------- 
        No |     1,601        372        258        313 |     2,544  
           |     41.27%     47.94%      44.95%    41.46%|     42.51%  
-----------+--------------------------------------------+---------- 
       Yes |     2,278        404        316        442 |     3,440  
           |     58.73%     52.06%     55.05%     58.54%|     57.49%  
-----------+--------------------------------------------+---------- 
     Total |     3,879        776        574        755 |     5,984  
           |    100.00%    100.00%    100.00%    100.00%|    100.00%  
 
Table 19 Percentage of respondents answering yes to the offer split by marital status 
 
 
Below, marital status: married, is used as reference 
maritalstatus_partner=living with a co-habitee   
maritalstatus_unmarried=never have been married 
maritalstatus_earlierm=widow/widower or divorced 
 
. logistic accepted_r maritalstatus_partner maritalstatus_unmarried maritalstatus_earlierm, 
robust cluster (respid) 
Logistic regression                               Number of obs   =       5984 
                                                  Wald chi2(3)    =       6.18 
                                                  Prob > chi2     =     0.1034 
Log pseudolikelihood = -4073.7408                 Pseudo R2       =     0.0016 
 
                              (Std. Err. adjusted for 2091 clusters in respid) 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
             |               Robust 
  accepted_r | Odds Ratio   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
maritalsta~r |   .7632662   .0886583    -2.33   0.020     .6078598     .958404 
mar~nmarried |   .8608054   .1172954    -1.10   0.271     .6590498    1.124325 
maritalsta~m |   .9924658   .1186268    -0.06   0.950      .785188    1.254462 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
 
. logistic accepted_r maritalstatus_partner maritalstatus_unmarried maritalstatus_earlierm, 
robust cluster (respid) coef 
Logistic regression                               Number of obs   =       5984 
                                                  Wald chi2(3)    =       6.18 
                                                  Prob > chi2     =     0.1034 
Log pseudolikelihood = -4073.7408                 Pseudo R2       =     0.0016 
 
                              (Std. Err. adjusted for 2091 clusters in respid) 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
             |               Robust 
  accepted_r |      Coef.   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
maritalsta~r |  -.2701484   .1161565    -2.33   0.020     -.497811   -.0424859 
mar~nmarried |  -.1498868   .1362624    -1.10   0.271    -.4169561    .1171825 
maritalsta~m |  -.0075627   .1195274    -0.06   0.950    -.2418321    .2267066 
       _cons |   .3526694   .0490468     7.19   0.000     .2565394    .4487994 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Table 20 Logistic regression on marital status 
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           | Persons in the household under 15 years old 
accepted_r | No childr    1 child  2 childre  3 or more |     Total 
-----------+--------------------------------------------+---------- 
        No |     1,189        467        397        165 |     2,218  
           |     43.13%     39.38%     43.01%     45.33%|     42.41%  
-----------+--------------------------------------------+---------- 
       Yes |     1,568        719        526        199 |     3,012  
           |     56.87%     60.62%     56.99%     54.67%|     57.59%  
-----------+--------------------------------------------+---------- 
     Total |     2,757      1,186        923        364 |     5,230  
           |    100.00%    100.00%    100.00%    100.00%|    100.00%  
Table 21 Percentage of respondents who answers yes to the offer split by number of children under 15 
years in the household 
 
 
Below, not living with children is used as reference. 
Living with children under 15 years old is coded as:  
children_1 (1 child) 
children_2 (2 children) 
children_3 (3 or more children) 
 
. logistic   accepted_r children_1 children_2 children_3, robust cluster (respid) 
Logistic regression                               Number of obs   =       5230 
                                                  Wald chi2(3)    =       2.86 
                                                  Prob > chi2     =     0.4134 
Log pseudolikelihood = -3561.4149                 Pseudo R2       =     0.0009 
 
                              (Std. Err. adjusted for 1829 clusters in respid) 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
             |               Robust 
  accepted_r | Odds Ratio   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
  children_1 |   1.167476   .1245543     1.45   0.147     .9471871    1.438997 
  children_2 |   1.004688    .116247     0.04   0.968     .8008351    1.260431 
  children_3 |   .9145447    .150395    -0.54   0.587     .6625621     1.26236 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
 
 
. logistic   accepted_r children_1 children_2 children_3, robust cluster (respid) coef 
Logistic regression                               Number of obs   =       5230 
                                                  Wald chi2(3)    =       2.86 
                                                  Prob > chi2     =     0.4134 
Log pseudolikelihood = -3561.4149                 Pseudo R2       =     0.0009 
 
                              (Std. Err. adjusted for 1829 clusters in respid) 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
             |               Robust 
  accepted_r |      Coef.   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
  children_1 |   .1548438   .1066869     1.45   0.147    -.0542586    .3639462 
  children_2 |   .0046766   .1157046     0.04   0.968    -.2221002    .2314535 
  children_3 |   -.089329    .164448    -0.54   0.587    -.4116411    .2329831 
       _cons |   .2766883   .0574446     4.82   0.000      .164099    .3892776 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
V.3 Logistic regression on independent variables and tendency to 
accept offer of life extension 
V.3.1 The independent variables influences in the chosen model 
Different combinations of independent variables were tried out in a larger model. In order to 
maximize the log likelihood of the model, the different background variables were taken out 
of the model separately. The highest log likelihood was found when all the chosen variables 
were included in the model. The model is presented first with coefficients and then with odds 
ratio in the following. This model was further refined before it was included in the article. The 
variable age is treated as one independent variable (from 40 to 59) instead of the four groups 
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presented below and living with children under 15 is treated as a dichotomous variable 
(yes/no) instead of the four groups. This was done mainly to simplify the model after the 
independent variables had been examined. 
A logistic regression was performed on a model with the chosen background variables: age, 
sex, level of education, household income, marital status and living with children under 15 
years old and the dependent variable: accepted_r. Age is divided in four groups: age40 
includes respondents from 40 to 44 years old, age45 includes respondents from 45 to 49 years 
old, age50 includes respondents from 50 to 54 years old and age55 includes respondents from 
55 to 59 years old. Sex is coded 0 if the respondent is a woman and 1if it is a man. Education 
is coded in the original ordinal groups from Gallup, in four levels. These were: nine-year 
compulsory school, upper secondary school, university up to and including 4 years and 
university over 4 years. The lowest level of education: nine-year compulsory school, is used 
as reference because this group can be seen as a starting point for comparisons with groups of 
respondents with higher education even if they do not constitute the largest group. The largest 
group is respondents with upper secondary school. Household income is coded as an ordinal 
variable in seven groups, from 1 to 7 as it was received from Gallup. This coding was kept 
because it was the highest available level of precision for the variable. Marital status was 
originally divided in four nominal groups; married, living with a partner, unmarried and 
previously married (widow/widower/divorced). No label of marital status is an obvious 
starting point to be used as reference but in this regression model, marital status: married is 
used as reference as these respondents constitute the largest group in the age range included. 
Living with children under 15 years old was also originally divided in four groups. These 
were labelled: no child, 1 child, 2 children and 3 or more children. Among those, no child is 
chosen as the reference point because this is the largest group and it can be seen as the natural 
starting point. Finally, the different offers of life extensions are included in the model, 
labelled extension. Accepted_r is positive if a respondent has answered “yes” to an offer of 
life extension to a given price. The name ending with a _r is chosen because the variable has 
been adjusted to fit in the regression model. Two models were made; one with a 1- year 
perspective for when the life extension would occur and one with a 10-year perspective for 
when the life extension would occur. A robust cluster on respondent identification is made in 
the regressions since each respondent had three different offers of life extensions.  
In the 1-year perspective, in the chosen model, there is a tendency for older respondents to be 
less positive toward the offer. The tendency to respond “yes” is not significantly lower for any 
age group. Men are less inclined to accept an offer of life extension compared to women, but 
the tendency is non-significant (P=0.062). All increasing levels of education are positive in 
comparison to nine-year compulsory school, and all levels are significantly positive (P=0.002) 
(P=0.004) (P=0.02). This implies that for this perspective, a respondent having more 
education than nine-year compulsory school seem to be more likely to accept the offer of life 
extension. Household income is positive and significant in the regression model (P=0.000) 
which implies that the higher the level of household income, the higher is the tendency for 
accepting the offer. The influence of household income was expected. It can be explained by a 
lower opportunity cost for the life extension price for higher income groups compared to 
lower income groups. Respondents living with a partner and unmarried respondents are less 
likely to answer positively compared to married respondents, but this tendency is non-
significant. Respondents being previously married are significantly more inclined to accept 
the offer compared to married (P=0.007). This last result is not the same as the result we get 
when the variable marital status is analysed separately. Then, respondents being previously 
married have about the same level of acceptance as married respondents (odds ratio .985). 
The result in the main model, which looks a little odd, might be explained by the lower 
 84
number of respondents being previously married than married respondents and their different 
pattern of household income. The higher percentage of acceptance among the lower income 
group among these respondents can explain the results in the main model. Respondents who 
have one or two children are more inclined to accept the offer than respondents without a 
child but the tendency is non-significant. Respondents with 3 or more children are less 
inclined to accept the offer than respondents without any children but the tendency is non-
significant. The offer of life extension is significantly positive (P=0.000) which implies that 
the longer the life extension, the more likely is the respondent to accept the offer. The 
significant variables in this perspective were life extension (positive), household income 
(positive), all levels of increasing education (positive), and being previously married 
(positive). 
 In the 10-years perspective, the results are a bit different from the 1-year perspective. The 
increasing levels of education are negative in comparison to nine-year compulsory school, but 
the trend is non-significant. This implies that a respondent having more education than nine-
year compulsory school seem to be less likely to accept the offer of life extension. but the 
tendency is so weak that it could be a coincidence. For this perspective, is seemed that 
respondents with children are a bit less likely to accept the offer, but the tendency is again not 
significant. The significant variables in this perspective were life extension (positive P=0.000), 
household income (positive P=0.000), living with a partner (negative P=-0.001) age55 
(negative P=-0.013) age50 (negative P=-0.029).  
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. * The respondents answers to the offers of life extension is coded in accepted_r.  
. * All respondents have answered yes/no to 3 offers and that is the reason for making 
. * a robust cluster on respondent identification in the regressions. 
.  
. by perspective, sort:logistic  accepted_r  age45 age50 age55 sex_r 
education_upper_secondary_school education_university_including4y education_university_over_4y 
houshold_inc maritalstatus_partner maritalstatus_unmarried maritalstatus_earlierm children_1 
children_2 children_3 extension, robust cluster (respid) coef  
 
 
 
-> perspective = 1 year 
Logistic regression                               Number of obs   =       2645 
                                                  Wald chi2(15)   =      81.20 
                                                  Prob > chi2     =     0.0000 
Log pseudolikelihood = -1750.4051                 Pseudo R2       =     0.0432 
 
                               (Std. Err. adjusted for 918 clusters in respid) 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
             |               Robust 
  accepted_r |      Coef.   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
       age45 |  -.0003176   .1739149    -0.00   0.999    -.3411846    .3405494 
       age50 |  -.0426901   .1895106    -0.23   0.822    -.4141241    .3287439 
       age55 |  -.2016001   .2061618    -0.98   0.328    -.6056698    .2024696 
       sex_r |   -.229708   .1229056    -1.87   0.062    -.4705985    .0111824 
education_~l |   .8695195   .2748348     3.16   0.002     .3308532    1.408186 
educatio~g4y |   .8346578   .2826724     2.95   0.003     .2806301    1.388686 
educatio~_4y |   .7095553   .2995015     2.37   0.018      .122543    1.296567 
houshold_inc |   .3352456   .0605327     5.54   0.000     .2166038    .4538874 
maritalsta~r |   -.005978   .1746562    -0.03   0.973    -.3482979    .3363419 
mar~nmarried |   -.169944    .354671    -0.48   0.632    -.8650863    .5251983 
maritalsta~m |     .61959   .2329191     2.66   0.008     .1630769    1.076103 
  children_1 |   .1121212   .1649424     0.68   0.497      -.21116    .4354024 
  children_2 |      .0513   .1917063     0.27   0.789    -.3244374    .4270374 
  children_3 |  -.0612145   .2767507    -0.22   0.825    -.6036359    .4812069 
   extension |   .0161242   .0030948     5.21   0.000     .0100586    .0221899 
       _cons |  -2.011726   .3699379    -5.44   0.000    -2.736791   -1.286661 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
 
 
-> perspective = 10 years 
Logistic regression                               Number of obs   =       2585 
                                                  Wald chi2(15)   =     125.31 
                                                  Prob > chi2     =     0.0000 
Log pseudolikelihood = -1638.6669                 Pseudo R2       =     0.0414 
 
                               (Std. Err. adjusted for 911 clusters in respid) 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
             |               Robust 
  accepted_r |      Coef.   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
       age45 |   -.244424   .1713458    -1.43   0.154    -.5802555    .0914075 
       age50 |  -.4137854   .2024837    -2.04   0.041    -.8106462   -.0169245 
       age55 |   -.561972   .2270668    -2.47   0.013    -1.007015   -.1169292 
       sex_r |  -.0872275   .1267861    -0.69   0.491    -.3357236    .1612686 
education_~l |  -.2809747   .2654443    -1.06   0.290    -.8012361    .2392866 
educatio~g4y |  -.2285949   .2795983    -0.82   0.414    -.7765976    .3194078 
educatio~_4y |  -.2799683   .2909175    -0.96   0.336    -.8501562    .2902196 
houshold_inc |   .2640543    .066606     3.96   0.000     .1335089    .3945998 
maritalsta~r |  -.5782672    .169642    -3.41   0.001    -.9107595    -.245775 
mar~nmarried |  -.1165612   .3944224    -0.30   0.768     -.889615    .6564926 
maritalsta~m |   .3945341   .2624265     1.50   0.133    -.1198123    .9088805 
  children_1 |  -.1004751   .1750203    -0.57   0.566    -.4435085    .2425584 
  children_2 |  -.3675701   .1999261    -1.84   0.066     -.759418    .0242777 
  children_3 |   -.435441   .2599025    -1.68   0.094    -.9448405    .0739585 
   extension |   .0192439   .0020584     9.35   0.000     .0152094    .0232783 
       _cons |  -.0265317   .3735054    -0.07   0.943    -.7585888    .7055253 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Table 22 Logistic regression with coefficients on selected model for both perspectives 
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. by perspective, sort:logistic  accepted_r  age45 age50 age55 sex_r 
education_upper_secondary_school education_university_including4y education_university_over_4y 
houshold_inc maritalstatus_partner maritalstatus_unmarried maritalstatus_earlierm children_1 
children_2 children_3 extension, robust cluster (respid)   
 
-> perspective = 1 year 
Logistic regression                               Number of obs   =       2645 
                                                  Wald chi2(15)   =      81.20 
                                                  Prob > chi2     =     0.0000 
Log pseudolikelihood = -1750.4051                 Pseudo R2       =     0.0432 
 
                               (Std. Err. adjusted for 918 clusters in respid) 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
             |               Robust 
  accepted_r | Odds Ratio   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
       age45 |   .9996824   .1738597    -0.00   0.999     .7109277     1.40572 
       age50 |   .9582083   .1815907    -0.23   0.822     .6609189    1.389222 
       age55 |   .8174218   .1685211    -0.98   0.328     .5457088    1.224423 
       sex_r |   .7947656   .0976811    -1.87   0.062     .6246283    1.011245 
education_~l |   2.385764    .655691     3.16   0.002     1.392155    4.088531 
educatio~g4y |   2.304026   .6512844     2.95   0.003     1.323964    4.009576 
educatio~_4y |   2.033087   .6089126     2.37   0.018     1.130368    3.656723 
houshold_inc |   1.398284   .0846418     5.54   0.000     1.241852    1.574421 
maritalsta~r |   .9940398   .1736153    -0.03   0.973     .7058885    1.399818 
mar~nmarried |    .843712   .2992402    -0.48   0.632     .4210152    1.690794 
maritalsta~m |   1.858166   .4328024     2.66   0.008     1.177127    2.933227 
  children_1 |   1.118648   .1845126     0.68   0.497     .8096445    1.545585 
  children_2 |   1.052639   .2017974     0.27   0.789      .722934     1.53271 
  children_3 |   .9406214   .2603176    -0.22   0.825     .5468198    1.618026 
   extension |   1.016255   .0031451     5.21   0.000     1.010109    1.022438 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
 
 
-> perspective = 10 years 
Logistic regression                               Number of obs   =       2585 
                                                  Wald chi2(15)   =     125.31 
                                                  Prob > chi2     =     0.0000 
Log pseudolikelihood = -1638.6669                 Pseudo R2       =     0.0414 
 
                               (Std. Err. adjusted for 911 clusters in respid) 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
             |               Robust 
  accepted_r | Odds Ratio   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
       age45 |   .7831555   .1341904    -1.43   0.154     .5597553    1.095715 
       age50 |   .6611428   .1338707    -2.04   0.041     .4445707    .9832179 
       age55 |   .5700838   .1294471    -2.47   0.013     .3653079    .8896482 
       sex_r |   .9164686   .1161955    -0.69   0.491     .7148206    1.175001 
education_~l |   .7550474   .2004231    -1.06   0.290     .4487739    1.270343 
educatio~g4y |   .7956508   .2224626    -0.82   0.414     .4599684    1.376312 
educatio~_4y |   .7558077   .2198777    -0.96   0.336     .4273482    1.336721 
houshold_inc |   1.302199   .0867343     3.96   0.000     1.142831     1.48379 
maritalsta~r |   .5608694    .095147    -3.41   0.001     .4022186    .7820982 
mar~nmarried |   .8899756   .3510264    -0.30   0.768     .4108139    1.928018 
maritalsta~m |   1.483693   .3893603     1.50   0.133     .8870869    2.481543 
  children_1 |   .9044077   .1582897    -0.57   0.566     .6417808    1.274506 
  children_2 |   .6924148   .1384318    -1.84   0.066     .4679387    1.024575 
  children_3 |   .6469793   .1681515    -1.68   0.094     .3887416    1.076762 
   extension |    1.01943   .0020984     9.35   0.000     1.015326    1.023551 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Table 23 Logistic regression with odds ration on selected model for both perspectives 
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 V.3.2 Testing for interactions – illustrated with figures 
Next, the variable extension (life extension offer in weeks) was tested for interactions with all 
the included background variables in the model. In the 1-year perspective, the only significant 
interaction was found between extension and household income. This is interpreted as: the 
higher the income is for the respondent, the more inclined becomes the respondent to prefer 
the longer life extension offers over the shorter life extension offers. In the 10-years 
perspective, a significant interaction was found, in addition to extension and household 
income, between extension and living with children under 15 years old. Respondents who are 
living with children under 15 years have a higher tendency to prefer longer offers of life 
extensions to the shorter life extension offers. The interaction between extension and 
household income is illustrated below. 
 
 
Figure 7 Interaction between extension and household income. Acceptance rates for offers of life 
extensions in weeks one year from today grouped by household income. 
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Figure 8 Interactions between extension and household income. Acceptance rates for offers of life 
extension in weeks ten years from today grouped by household income. 
V.4 Maximum WTP/week life extension 
 
    offer   Freq mean   Std.Dev.   min   median   max 
  1 y 1 w       514 6393.093     25374.21       0            500         500000 
  1 y 2 w       496 8834.778     55345.33       0           2500        1000000 
  1 y 4 w       514 4184.192     8545.494       0           2500         125000 
  1 y 2 m       496 3365.688     5048.077      0           2500          62500 
  1 y 4 m       515 2958.118     4793.289       0           2500          62500 
  1 y 8 m       497 3283.331     7422.913       0           2500         100000 
 10 y 2 w       493 5695.842     36304.72       0            500         500000 
 10 y 3 w       496 2226.915     4645.955       0            500          50000 
 10 y 2 m       520 3982.416     44307.59       0            500        1000000 
 10 y 3 m       487 1403.285     2417.688       0            500          10000 
 10 y 8 m       504 3326.457     44596.74       0            500        1000000 
 10 y 1 y        482 3518.82      45548.06       0            500        1000000 
Total 6014 4104.23  30618.19       
Table 24 Min, mean, median, std.dev, and max for respondents answers to their willingness to pay for 
each offer. 
 
 
V.5 Respondents with zero WTP 
The respondents who had answered that they did not want the life extension offer and who did 
not want to pay anything for it, i.e. with a zero WTP, were analysed. The results show a 
decreasing percentage of respondents who did not want to pay anything with longer life 
extension offers. This result indicates an increasing valuation of longer life extensions. No 
clear threshold value is identified.  
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Figure 9 Percentage of respondents who answer 0 to the question of how much they would be willing to 
pay for the offer of life extension 
 
offer Number of 
respondents 
with zero WTP 
Percentage of 
respondents 
with zero WTP 
Number of 
respondents  
   1 y 1 w         176       34.24 %       514     
   1 y 2 w         141       28.43 %       496     
   1 y 4 w         133       25.88 %       514     
   1 y 2 m         116       23.39 %       496     
   1 y 4 m          98       19.03 %       515     
   1 y 8 m          74       14.89 %       497     
  10 y 2 w         180       36.51 %       493     
  10 y 3 w         166       33.47 %       496     
  10 y 2 m         154       29.62 %       520     
  10 y 3 m         132       27.10 %       487     
  10 y 8 m          96       19.05 %       504     
  10 y 1 y          66       13.69 %       482     
     Total       1,532       25.47 %     6,014     
Table 25 Number and percentage of respondents who answer 0 to the question of how much they would be 
willing to pay for the offer life extension 
 
V.6 Linear regression on independent variables and WTP of life 
extension offers 
The respondents’ maximum WTP/week were analysed with the variable WTP_week. In linear 
regression, the outcome variable should be continuous. Different combinations of background 
variables were tested as in the logistic regression on acceptance rates but the final model was 
the same. The robust cluster- command was also included as in the logistic regression models.  
 
In the 1-year perspective, the significant variables were life extension (negative P=0.004), 
education_university_including4y (positive P=0.014), marital status_partner (negative P=-
0.030) and education_upper_secondary_school (positive P=0.028). Household_inc was 
almost significant (positive P=0.058). These results indicate that the WTP/week is lower the 
longer the life extension offers. This opposes the results from the acceptance offers. Higher 
education seems to indicate higher WTP/week compared to nine-year compulsory school. 
Higher household income seems to generate higher WTP/week, which is logical and as 
expected.  
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The capped-model, which excludes the answers with the 5 % highest WTP/week, is used to 
avoid the extreme values. In the capped model, life extension is still significantly negative 
(P=-0.001), the influence of education changes a little bit as education_university_over_4y 
becomes significantly positive (P=0.016) and education_upper_secondary_school becomes 
non-significant. Education_university_including4y (positive P=0.041) is significant also in 
this model. The other variables are not significant in the capped model.  
In the 10-years perspective, there were no significant variables. The offer of life extension 
was weakly positive, but non-significant.  
In the capped model, extension becomes negative and significant (P=0.000) and household 
income becomes positive and significant (P=0.000). The other variables remained non-
significant.    
It does not seem as the capped model changes the basic regression model to such a large 
degree that it should be used instead of the basic model. It is seen as a complement in the 
analysis. 
   
. by perspective, sort:reg WTP_week age sex_r education_upper_secondary_school 
education_university_including4y education_university_over_4y houshold_inc 
maritalstatus_partner maritalstatus_unmarried maritalstatus_earlierm childrenunder15 extension, 
robust cluster (respid)   
 
-> perspective = 1 year 
Linear regression                                      Number of obs =    2662 
                                                       F( 11,   932) =    3.72 
                                                       Prob > F      =  0.0000 
                                                       R-squared     =  0.0109 
Number of clusters (respid) = 933                      Root MSE      =   22951 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
             |               Robust 
    WTP_week |      Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
         age |   86.05482   104.9382     0.82   0.412    -119.8877    291.9973 
       sex_r |   1016.613   757.4195     1.34   0.180    -469.8322    2503.058 
education_~l |   1271.327   579.0609     2.20   0.028     134.9126    2407.741 
educatio~g4y |   2907.864   1176.025     2.47   0.014     599.9011    5215.828 
educatio~_4y |   724.7939   1256.529     0.58   0.564     -1741.16    3190.748 
houshold_inc |   1312.158   692.1139     1.90   0.058    -46.12455     2670.44 
maritalsta~r |  -1191.697   547.3101    -2.18   0.030      -2265.8    -117.594 
mar~nmarried |   1256.805   1717.389     0.73   0.464    -2113.592    4627.202 
maritalsta~m |   990.4587   912.2044     1.09   0.278    -799.7539    2780.671 
childrenu~15 |   1863.188    1504.03     1.24   0.216    -1088.489    4814.865 
   extension |  -94.37601   32.97051    -2.86   0.004    -159.0811   -29.67097 
       _cons |  -6752.919   7140.487    -0.95   0.345    -20766.21    7260.376 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
 
-> perspective = 10 years 
Linear regression                                      Number of obs =    2601 
                                                       F( 11,   927) =    1.38 
                                                       Prob > F      =  0.1743 
                                                       R-squared     =  0.0255 
Number of clusters (respid) = 928                      Root MSE      =   36575 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
             |               Robust 
    WTP_week |      Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
         age |  -6.816186   177.2537    -0.04   0.969    -354.6813    341.0489 
       sex_r |  -1577.852   2950.743    -0.53   0.593    -7368.762    4213.059 
education_~l |   1016.063   1020.244     1.00   0.320    -986.1919    3018.318 
educatio~g4y |    832.585   2617.688     0.32   0.751    -4304.697    5969.867 
educatio~_4y |  -3922.468   3103.121    -1.26   0.207    -10012.42    2167.488 
houshold_inc |   4925.691   3220.477     1.53   0.126     -1394.58    11245.96 
maritalsta~r |   5926.194   6603.278     0.90   0.370    -7032.913     18885.3 
mar~nmarried |   22174.62   16778.76     1.32   0.187    -10754.14    55103.37 
maritalsta~m |   6241.721   4256.995     1.47   0.143    -2112.745    14596.19 
childrenu~15 |  -2640.995   2398.992    -1.10   0.271    -7349.081     2067.09 
   extension |   2.738287   42.40376     0.06   0.949    -80.48021    85.95679 
       _cons |  -14580.88   17066.99    -0.85   0.393     -48075.3    18913.53 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Table 26 Linear regression for the first model on willingness to pay per week. 
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. by perspective, sort:reg WTP_week_capped age sex_r education_upper_secondary_school 
education_university_including4y education_university_over_4y houshold_inc 
maritalstatus_partner maritalstatus_unmarried maritalstatus_earlierm childrenunder15 extension, 
robust cluster (respid)   
 
-> perspective = 1 year 
Linear regression                                      Number of obs =    3159 
                                                       F( 11,  1052) =    2.83 
                                                       Prob > F      =  0.0012 
                                                       R-squared     =  0.0159 
Number of clusters (respid) = 1053                     Root MSE      =  5886.5 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
             |               Robust 
WTP_week_c~d |      Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
         age |   -7.24869   35.63294    -0.20   0.839     -77.1684    62.67102 
       sex_r |    170.211   331.7588     0.51   0.608    -480.7733    821.1953 
education_~l |   1038.832    697.995     1.49   0.137    -330.7888    2408.453 
educatio~g4y |   1490.892   726.9388     2.05   0.041     64.47719    2917.307 
educatio~_4y |   1872.564   777.0715     2.41   0.016     347.7775    3397.351 
houshold_inc |   241.9923   163.3052     1.48   0.139    -78.44864    562.4332 
maritalsta~r |   329.4083   482.3387     0.68   0.495    -617.0471    1275.864 
mar~nmarried |  -1046.886   826.3979    -1.27   0.206    -2668.461    574.6903 
maritalsta~m |    774.693   672.2854     1.15   0.249    -544.4799    2093.866 
childrenu~15 |   251.4182   394.4444     0.64   0.524     -522.569    1025.405 
   extension |  -24.44359    7.31509    -3.34   0.001    -38.79742   -10.08976 
       _cons |   3216.156   2046.561     1.57   0.116    -799.6507    7231.963 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
 
-> perspective = 10 years 
Linear regression                                      Number of obs =    3117 
                                                       F( 11,  1038) =   14.44 
                                                       Prob > F      =  0.0000 
                                                       R-squared     =  0.0398 
Number of clusters (respid) = 1039                     Root MSE      =    3254 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
             |               Robust 
WTP_week_c~d |      Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
         age |  -15.10501   19.74165    -0.77   0.444    -53.84311    23.63308 
       sex_r |   113.6709   173.7582     0.65   0.513    -227.2865    454.6284 
education_~l |  -381.3189   363.4747    -1.05   0.294    -1094.548    331.9101 
educatio~g4y |  -592.2303   377.8391    -1.57   0.117    -1333.646    149.1852 
educatio~_4y |  -447.0576   393.9056    -1.13   0.257        -1220    325.8845 
houshold_inc |   345.8194   88.89153     3.89   0.000     171.3918    520.2469 
maritalsta~r |  -140.0744   247.3937    -0.57   0.571    -625.5232    345.3743 
mar~nmarried |   121.6797   457.6317     0.27   0.790     -776.309    1019.668 
maritalsta~m |   271.4346   339.0338     0.80   0.424    -393.8351    936.7044 
childrenu~15 |  -238.0771    215.658    -1.10   0.270    -661.2524    185.0981 
   extension |    -30.779    2.58377   -11.91   0.000    -35.84901   -25.70899 
       _cons |   2943.695     1144.8     2.57   0.010     697.3096     5190.08 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Table 27 Linear regression for the same model on willingness to pay per week capped in order to remove 
outliers. 
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An alternative model is presented below in which extension is separated in the different life 
extension offers in weeks. This is the model finally chosen to include in the article. 
 
. reg WTP_week age sex_r education_upper_secondary_school education_university_including4y 
education_university_over_4y houshold_inc maritalstatus_partner maritalstatus_unmarried 
maritalstatus_earlierm childrenunder15 ext2 ext4 ext8 ext16 ext32 if perspective=="1 year", 
robust cluster (respid)   
 
Linear regression                                      Number of obs =    2662 
                                                       F( 15,   932) =    3.58 
                                                       Prob > F      =  0.0000 
                                                       R-squared     =  0.0150 
Number of clusters (respid) = 933                      Root MSE      =   22919 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
             |               Robust 
    WTP_week |      Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
         age |   82.65799    102.219     0.81   0.419    -117.9481     283.264 
       sex_r |   1068.881   783.0766     1.36   0.173    -467.9161    2605.679 
education_~l |   1300.651   580.7088     2.24   0.025     161.0025    2440.299 
educatio~g4y |   2895.221   1174.423     2.47   0.014     590.4003    5200.042 
educatio~_4y |    765.021   1243.696     0.62   0.539    -1675.748     3205.79 
houshold_inc |   1305.874   687.8684     1.90   0.058    -44.07606    2655.825 
maritalsta~r |  -1249.378   561.6321    -2.22   0.026    -2351.588   -147.1678 
mar~nmarried |   1448.205   1779.471     0.81   0.416     -2044.03    4940.439 
maritalsta~m |    838.969   923.6473     0.91   0.364    -973.7004    2651.638 
childrenu~15 |   1845.966   1493.482     1.24   0.217    -1085.011    4776.942 
        ext2 |   2794.395   2603.331     1.07   0.283    -2314.675    7903.465 
        ext4 |  -1469.864    424.353    -3.46   0.001    -2302.662   -637.0659 
        ext8 |  -1947.938    642.135    -3.03   0.002    -3208.136   -687.7402 
       ext16 |   -2498.33      552.9    -4.52   0.000    -3583.404   -1413.257 
       ext32 |  -2009.304   697.9352    -2.88   0.004     -3379.01   -639.5969 
       _cons |  -6712.844   7650.763    -0.88   0.380    -21727.56    8301.875 
Table 28 Linear regression for selected model with nonlinear fit of willingness to pay to extension. 1 year 
perspective 
 
. reg WTP_week age sex_r education_upper_secondary_school education_university_including4y 
education_university_over_4y houshold_inc maritalstatus_partner maritalstatus_unmarried 
maritalstatus_earlierm childrenunder15 ext3 ext8 ext12 ext32 ext48 if perspective=="10 years", 
robust cluster (respid) 
 
Linear regression                                      Number of obs =    2601 
                                                       F( 15,   927) =    2.79 
                                                       Prob > F      =  0.0003 
                                                       R-squared     =  0.0267 
Number of clusters (respid) = 928                      Root MSE      =   36581 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
             |               Robust 
    WTP_week |      Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
         age |   2.458648   187.4265     0.01   0.990    -365.3709    370.2882 
       sex_r |  -1618.706   2989.985    -0.54   0.588     -7486.63    4249.219 
education_~l |    908.959    988.621     0.92   0.358    -1031.236    2849.154 
educatio~g4y |   780.4208   2569.353     0.30   0.761    -4262.003    5822.845 
educatio~_4y |  -3976.834   3139.528    -1.27   0.206    -10138.24    2184.573 
houshold_inc |    4953.01   3245.629     1.53   0.127    -1416.622    11322.64 
maritalsta~r |   5860.072   6541.628     0.90   0.371    -6978.045    18698.19 
mar~nmarried |   22305.19    16815.8     1.33   0.185    -10696.27    55306.65 
maritalsta~m |   6306.334   4307.959     1.46   0.144    -2148.149    14760.82 
childrenu~15 |  -2626.394   2398.371    -1.10   0.274     -7333.26    2080.471 
        ext3 |  -2969.928     1825.5    -1.63   0.104     -6552.52    612.6628 
        ext8 |  -942.6898   1435.353    -0.66   0.511    -3759.607    1874.228 
       ext12 |  -3834.579   1818.848    -2.11   0.035    -7404.116   -265.0411 
       ext32 |  -1504.517   1658.315    -0.91   0.365    -4759.005     1749.97 
       ext48 |  -1494.726   2905.403    -0.51   0.607    -7196.656    4207.203 
       _cons |  -13229.34   17372.91    -0.76   0.447    -47324.14    20865.45 
Table 29 Linear regression for selected model with nonlinear fit of willingness to pay to extension. 10 
years perspective 
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V.7 Linearity in maximum WTP within the respondent 
A minority of the respondents were strictly linear in their WTP (32.3 %). The largest group 
was decreasing (36.9 %), 26.6 % were increasing and 4.23 % were classified as uncertain in 
their WTP for increasing life extensions. When the respondents were classified according to 
household income the pattern was different. In all income groups, except the group 400 000 to 
599 999 and the highest income group (1 200 000 or more) the largest groups of respondents 
were decreasing (D). In the group (400 000 to 599 999) the largest group was linear (L) and in 
the highest income group, the largest part was increasing (I). There is a clear difference in the 
distribution of respondents between the lowest and the highest income groups. In the lowest 
group, the percentage decreasing respondents is 47.9 %, 20.8 % are increasing and 25.0 % are 
linear. In the highest income group, the percentage decreasing respondents is 31.6 %, 35.1 % 
are increasing and 28.1 % are linear. 
 
 
 
     Yearly household | 
  income before taxes |                    w4kr 
               in NOK |         D          I          L          U |     Total 
----------------------+--------------------------------------------+---------- 
        under 200 000 |        23         10         12          3 |        48  
                      |     47.92%     20.83%     25.00%      6.25%|    100.00%  
----------------------+--------------------------------------------+---------- 
   200 000 to 399 999 |       139         81        111         10 |       341  
                      |     40.76%     23.75%     32.55%      2.93%|    100.00%  
----------------------+--------------------------------------------+---------- 
   400 000 to 599 999 |       197        141        201         23 |       562  
                      |     35.05%     25.09%     35.77%      4.09%|    100.00%  
----------------------+--------------------------------------------+---------- 
   600 000 to 799 999 |       214        166        187         31 |       598  
                      |     35.79%     27.76%     31.27%      5.18%|    100.00%  
----------------------+--------------------------------------------+---------- 
   800 000 to 999 999 |        93         71         88          8 |       260  
                      |     35.77%     27.31%     33.85%      3.08%|    100.00%  
----------------------+--------------------------------------------+---------- 
1 000 000 to 1 199 00 |        32         26         12          4 |        74  
                      |     43.24%     35.14%     16.22%      5.41%|    100.00%  
----------------------+--------------------------------------------+---------- 
    1 200 000 or more |        18         20         16          3 |        57  
                      |     31.58%     35.09%     28.07%      5.26%|    100.00%  
----------------------+--------------------------------------------+---------- 
                Total |       716        515        627         82 |     1,940  
                      |     36.91%     26.55%     32.32%      4.23%|    100.00%  
 
Table 30 Changes in willingness to pay split by household income. D=Decreasing, I=Increasing, L=Linear 
and U=Undecided (Neither of the others) 
 
                |                    w4kr 
  questionnaire |         D          I          L          U |     Total 
----------------+--------------------------------------------+---------- 
questionnaire 1 |       186        133        165         17 |       501  
                |     37.13      26.55      32.93       3.39 |    100.00  
----------------+--------------------------------------------+---------- 
questionnaire 2 |       184        123        151         27 |       485  
                |     37.94      25.36      31.13       5.57 |    100.00  
----------------+--------------------------------------------+---------- 
questionnaire 3 |       187        114        168         14 |       483  
                |     38.72      23.60      34.78       2.90 |    100.00  
----------------+--------------------------------------------+---------- 
questionnaire 4 |       159        145        143         24 |       471  
                |     33.76      30.79      30.36       5.10 |    100.00  
----------------+--------------------------------------------+---------- 
          Total |       716        515        627         82 |     1,940  
                |     36.91      26.55      32.32       4.23 |    100.00  
Table 31 Changes in willingness to pay split by questionnaire. D=Decreasing, I=Increasing, L=Linear and 
U=Undecided (Neither of the others) 
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V.8 Health states of respondents 
   How do you find your | 
            own health? |      Freq.     Percent        Cum. 
------------------------+----------------------------------- 
              Very good |      2,301       31.93       31.93 
                   Good |      3,333       46.25       78.18 
  Neither good nor poor |      1,245       17.28       95.46 
                   Poor |        315        4.37       99.83 
              Very poor |         12        0.17      100.00 
------------------------+----------------------------------- 
                  Total |      7,206      100.00 
Table 32 Respondents health state as reported 
 
 
 How do you find your |      accepted_r 
          own health? |        No        Yes |     Total 
----------------------+----------------------+---------- 
            Very good |       728      1,141 |     1,869  
                      |     38.95%     61.05%|    100.00%  
----------------------+----------------------+---------- 
                 Good |     1,184      1,619 |     2,803  
                      |     42.24%     57.76%|    100.00%  
----------------------+----------------------+---------- 
Neither good nor poor |       496        558 |     1,054  
                      |     47.06%     52.94%|    100.00%  
----------------------+----------------------+---------- 
                 Poor |       128        122 |       250  
                      |     51.20%     48.80%|    100.00%  
----------------------+----------------------+---------- 
            Very poor |         8          3 |        11  
                      |     72.73%     27.27%|    100.00%  
----------------------+----------------------+---------- 
                Total |     2,544      3,443 |     5,987  
                      |     42.49%     57.51%|    100.00%  
Table 33 Percentage of respondents accepting the offer of life extension split by health state 
 
 
 
           |         How do you find your own health? 
           |                      Neither good 
     offer | Very good       Good   nor poor       Poor  Very poor |     Total 
-----------+-------------------------------------------------------+---------- 
   1 y 1 w |     49.7%      42.1%      41.3%      50.0%          . |     44.3% 
           |       145        261         92         14          0 |       512 
-----------+-------------------------------------------------------+---------- 
   1 y 2 w |     50.9%      52.5%      53.2%      34.8%          1 |     51.3% 
           |       171        223         79         23          1 |       497 
-----------+-------------------------------------------------------+---------- 
   1 y 4 w |     59.6%      50.2%      48.5%      46.7%          . |     52.5% 
           |       146        257         91         15          0 |       509 
-----------+-------------------------------------------------------+---------- 
   1 y 2 m |     60.0%      55.9%  .   55.7%      43.5%       100% |     56.8% 
           |       170        222         79         23          1 |       495 
-----------+-------------------------------------------------------+---------- 
   1 y 4 m |     66.9%      57.1%      46.7%      40.0%          . |     57.5% 
           |       142        261         92         15          0 |       510 
-----------+-------------------------------------------------------+---------- 
   1 y 8 m |     61.9%      58.2%      58.2%      36.4%       100% |     58.6% 
           |       168        225         79         22          1 |       495 
-----------+-------------------------------------------------------+---------- 
     Total |     58.1%      52.4%      50.2%      41.1%       100% |     53.4% 
           |       942       1449        512        112          3 |      3018 
Table 34 Percentage of respondents accepting the offer of life extension and number of respondents split 
by extension and health state. 1 year perspective 
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           |         How do you find your own health? 
     offer | Meget god        God  Verken go     Dårlig  Meget dår |     Total 
-----------+-------------------------------------------------------+---------- 
  10 y 2 w |      53.2%      55.2%      49.4%      51.7%         0%|      53.2% 
           |       154        221         85         29          1 |       490 
-----------+-------------------------------------------------------+---------- 
  10 y 3 w |      62.5%      55.1%      49.5%      62.5%         0%|      56.5% 
           |       155        225         93         16          1 |       490 
-----------+-------------------------------------------------------+---------- 
  10 y 2 m |      60.7%      62.2%      55.7%      54.8%         0%|      60.0% 
           |       158        238         88         31          2 |       517 
-----------+-------------------------------------------------------+---------- 
  10 y 3 m |      62.9%      54.5%      54.7%      62.5%         0%|      62.3% 
           |       154        220         95         16          1 |       486 
-----------+-------------------------------------------------------+---------- 
  10 y 8 m |      66.0%      67.0%      55.2%      46.7%         0%|      63.2% 
           |       153        233         87         30          2 |       505 
-----------+-------------------------------------------------------+---------- 
  10 y 1 y |      79.0%      76.0%      68.1%      62.5%         0%|      74.8% 
           |       153        217         94         16          1 |       481 
-----------+-------------------------------------------------------+---------- 
     Total |      64.0%      63.4%      55.5%      55.1%         0%|      61.6% 
           |       927       1354        542        138          8 |      2969 
Table 35 Percentage of respondents accepting the offer of life extension and number of respondents split 
by extension and health state. 10 years perspective 
V.8.1 Health state influence in the logistic- and linear regression models 
reg WTP_week age sex_r education_upper_secondary_school education_university_including4y 
education_university_over_4y houshold_inc maritalstatus_partner maritalstatus_unmarried 
maritalstatus_earlierm childrenunder15 ext2 ext4 ext8 ext16 ext32 q50 if perspective=="1 year", 
robust cluster (respid) 
Linear regression                                      Number of obs =    2662 
                                                       F( 16,   932) =    3.39 
                                                       Prob > F      =  0.0000 
                                                       R-squared     =  0.0151 
                                                       Root MSE      =   22924 
                               (Std. Err. adjusted for 933 clusters in respid) 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
             |               Robust 
    WTP_week |      Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
         age |   83.43428   103.2342     0.81   0.419    -119.1641    286.0326 
       sex_r |   1071.746   785.7617     1.36   0.173    -470.3211    2613.813 
education_~l |   1305.111   572.4182     2.28   0.023     181.7333    2428.489 
educatio~g4y |   2882.321   1183.257     2.44   0.015     560.1652    5204.477 
educatio~_4y |   758.3055   1261.677     0.60   0.548    -1717.751    3234.362 
houshold_inc |   1294.493   650.0825     1.99   0.047     18.69823    2570.288 
maritalsta~r |  -1243.353   560.6499    -2.22   0.027    -2343.635   -143.0703 
mar~nmarried |   1429.535   1749.753     0.82   0.414    -2004.377    4863.447 
maritalsta~m |   808.6845   862.0015     0.94   0.348    -883.0042    2500.373 
childrenu~15 |    1828.06   1443.492     1.27   0.206     -1004.81    4660.931 
        ext2 |    2792.09   2600.458     1.07   0.283    -2311.341    7895.522 
        ext4 |  -1469.989   424.4007    -3.46   0.001    -2302.881   -637.0975 
        ext8 |  -1950.318   643.3085    -3.03   0.002    -3212.819   -687.8167 
       ext16 |  -2497.121   553.3158    -4.51   0.000     -3583.01   -1411.232 
       ext32 |  -2012.047   697.8273    -2.88   0.004    -3381.542    -642.552 
         q50 |  -131.5106   588.4076    -0.22   0.823    -1286.268    1023.247 
       _cons |  -6441.248    7159.43    -0.90   0.369    -20491.72    7609.224 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Table 36 Linear regression for selected model expanded with health state. 1 year perspective 
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. reg WTP_week age sex_r education_upper_secondary_school education_university_including4y 
education_university_over_4y houshold_inc maritalstatus_partner maritalstatus_unmarried 
maritalstatus_earlierm childrenunder15 ext3 ext8 ext12 ext32 ext48 q50 if perspective=="10 
years", robust cluster (respid) 
Linear regression                                      Number of obs =    2601 
                                                       F( 16,   927) =    2.65 
                                                       Prob > F      =  0.0004 
                                                       R-squared     =  0.0297 
                                                       Root MSE      =   36533 
                               (Std. Err. adjusted for 928 clusters in respid) 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
             |               Robust 
    WTP_week |      Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
         age |  -32.95278   174.2356    -0.19   0.850    -374.8948    308.9893 
       sex_r |  -1599.787   2971.885    -0.54   0.590    -7432.189    4232.615 
education_~l |   1040.214   1112.143     0.94   0.350    -1142.396    3222.823 
educatio~g4y |   1183.763   2805.084     0.42   0.673    -4321.288    6688.814 
educatio~_4y |  -3465.796   2855.189    -1.21   0.225    -9069.181    2137.588 
houshold_inc |   5107.194   3345.709     1.53   0.127    -1458.849    11673.24 
maritalsta~r |   5937.708   6573.279     0.90   0.367    -6962.524    18837.94 
mar~nmarried |      22266   16715.88     1.33   0.183    -10539.35    55071.35 
maritalsta~m |   6763.787   4626.527     1.46   0.144    -2315.894    15843.47 
childrenu~15 |  -2537.348   2349.214    -1.08   0.280    -7147.743    2073.047 
        ext3 |  -2875.498   1778.517    -1.62   0.106    -6365.884    614.8893 
        ext8 |  -992.0245   1411.298    -0.70   0.482    -3761.734    1777.685 
       ext12 |  -3748.507   1775.376    -2.11   0.035    -7232.729   -264.2849 
       ext32 |   -1577.31   1624.194    -0.97   0.332    -4764.834    1610.215 
       ext48 |  -1435.266   2892.986    -0.50   0.620    -7112.828    4242.296 
         q50 |   2474.381   1839.296     1.35   0.179    -1135.286    6084.048 
       _cons |  -17315.64   20085.92    -0.86   0.389    -56734.78    22103.51 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Table 37 Linear regression for selected model expanded with health state. 10 years perspective 
 
 
. logistic accepted_r age sex_r education_upper_secondary_school 
education_university_including4y education_university_over_4y houshold_inc 
maritalstatus_partner maritalstatus_unmarried maritalstatus_earlierm childrenunder15 ext2 ext4 
ext8 ext16 ext32 q50 if perspective=="1 year", robust cluster (respid) 
Logistic regression                               Number of obs   =       2645 
                                                  Wald chi2(16)   =     107.67 
                                                  Prob > chi2     =     0.0000 
Log pseudolikelihood = -1744.5862                 Pseudo R2       =     0.0464 
                               (Std. Err. adjusted for 918 clusters in respid) 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
             |               Robust 
  accepted_r | Odds Ratio   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
         age |   .9954796   .0129066    -0.35   0.727     .9705018      1.0211 
       sex_r |   .7897206   .0974536    -1.91   0.056     .6200589    1.005806 
education_~l |   2.389431   .6598952     3.15   0.002     1.390645    4.105566 
educatio~g4y |   2.267875   .6430675     2.89   0.004     1.300938    3.953499 
educatio~_4y |   1.966407   .5902817     2.25   0.024     1.091836    3.541519 
houshold_inc |   1.394457   .0845802     5.48   0.000     1.238158    1.570487 
maritalsta~r |   1.014971   .1777907     0.08   0.932      .720029    1.430728 
mar~nmarried |   .8788751   .3119111    -0.36   0.716     .4383665    1.762045 
maritalsta~m |   1.829422    .427512     2.58   0.010     1.157175    2.892201 
childrenu~15 |   1.093071   .1593301     0.61   0.542     .8214369     1.45453 
        ext2 |    1.36558   .1916527     2.22   0.026     1.037182    1.797957 
        ext4 |   1.419973   .1010711     4.93   0.000     1.235075    1.632552 
        ext8 |    1.70803   .2396653     3.82   0.000     1.297352     2.24871 
       ext16 |   1.763047   .1699752     5.88   0.000     1.459485    2.129747 
       ext32 |   1.957038   .2747139     4.78   0.000     1.486327    2.576822 
         q50 |   .9039733   .0712073    -1.28   0.200     .7746495    1.054887 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Table 38 Logistic regression for selected model expanded with health state. 1 year perspective 
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 98
. logistic accepted_r age sex_r education_upper_secondary_school 
education_university_including4y education_university_over_4y houshold_inc 
maritalstatus_partner maritalstatus_unmarried maritalstatus_earlierm childrenunder15 ext3 ext8 
ext12 ext32 ext48 q50 if perspective=="10 years", robust cluster (respid) 
Logistic regression                               Number of obs   =       2585 
                                                  Wald chi2(16)   =     124.67 
                                                  Prob > chi2     =     0.0000 
Log pseudolikelihood = -1633.1276                 Pseudo R2       =     0.0446 
                               (Std. Err. adjusted for 911 clusters in respid) 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
             |               Robust 
  accepted_r | Odds Ratio   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
         age |   .9695465   .0135603    -2.21   0.027     .9433297    .9964918 
       sex_r |     .91259    .115615    -0.72   0.470      .711931    1.169805 
education_~l |   .7390071   .1953716    -1.14   0.253     .4401656    1.240741 
educatio~g4y |   .7680536   .2142245    -0.95   0.344     .4446063    1.326806 
educatio~_4y |   .7156721   .2082935    -1.15   0.250     .4045529    1.266056 
houshold_inc |    1.28876   .0859108     3.81   0.000     1.130914    1.468638 
maritalsta~r |   .5487933   .0934149    -3.53   0.000     .3931138    .7661244 
mar~nmarried |   .9171202   .3570006    -0.22   0.824     .4276469    1.966832 
maritalsta~m |   1.462952   .3824697     1.46   0.146      .876384    2.442112 
childrenu~15 |   .7893659   .1254397    -1.49   0.137     .5781124    1.077816 
        ext3 |   1.211253   .1707021     1.36   0.174     .9189141    1.596596 
        ext8 |   1.345981   .0913321     4.38   0.000     1.178366    1.537438 
       ext12 |    1.59028    .227696     3.24   0.001     1.201154    2.105468 
       ext32 |   1.617073   .1624352     4.78   0.000     1.328087    1.968942 
       ext48 |   3.175938   .4918101     7.46   0.000     2.344548    4.302143 
         q50 |   .8812737   .0678609    -1.64   0.101     .7578192     1.02484 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Table 39 Logistic regression for selected model expanded with health state. 10 years perspective 
